


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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Military Affairs

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Defense Counselor Volkogonov Profiled

92UM1064A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 6 May 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Colonel-General Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov by E. Kotlyar: "Counselor for Defense Questions"]

[Text] How does a president choose his advisers? In a government of reforms, these persons bear enormous responsibility to the nation. They are not simply specialists or political figures. Many of them in the period of the party dictatorship did not fear raising their voices in defense of the people's interests, and from the first democratic changes sided with Yeltsin, sharing with him the thankless lot of the pioneers in the destroyed, long-suffering Russia.

Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov is one of those who endured the path to the truth. Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Colonel-General Volkogonov with his profound knowledge of the army mechanism is the counselor on defense questions on the Yeltsin team.

His life mirrors the age with its abrupt turns of Stalinist repression and a hungry military youth. A path of moral agonies is characteristic for those who have reached the age of 60. But each of them has covered the distance in his own way and many did not endure but caved in under the burden of the contradictions while others preferred to remain with their dogmatic notions of the "eternal justice of the class struggle" in which all means are aimed at living as usually and calmly as possible! The younger generation to which Volkogonov belongs was exposed in the past to strong ideological pressure from the Stalinist cult, with all the achievements of the country being linked to the leader's name. It was seditious to allow the thought that the plans for industrialization and collectivization, as also, incidentally, the victory over Nazi Germany, were at a price of colossal sacrifices by the people.

The young Volkogonov early on felt the harsh nature of the Stalinist state, as he was to become not only the "son" but also the "grandson of the enemy of the people!" He grew up in the Transbaykal Area, the sad land of Stalinist camps. From his childhood he witnessed the endless flow of human grief. In 1937, his grandfather was arrested and executed, his father was sent to the camps while his mother went into exile with the children. But the Stalinist system inherited unpredictability from the history of Russia! While it dealt harshly with Volkogonov's family, it was benevolent to him. Regardless of his "tarnished" dossier, at an age of a little more than 40, Volkogonov was given the rank of general. Becoming infatuated with military history and examining its sources, he unexpectedly reached the seditious

conclusion on the true role of Stalinism in society. After the loss of his family in childhood, this was his second personal tragedy.

The ideological awareness formed by the orthodox mold of "belief in the leader and teacher" was shaken to its base. Initially timidly and then ever more insistently, there was a need felt to set to researching; this later overstepped the limits of a purely scientific work and assumed particular social significance. The problems of the Stalinist genesis and the amoral war against his own people became under the researcher's pen a chronicle of the bloody period in Russia's history.

Volkogonov's work did not have the slightest hope of being published as the "fans of revelations" constantly attacked it, accusing the author of double-dealing, here cleverly substituting the concept of the breaking down of a personality, when a burning feeling of dissatisfaction with oneself gives no respite and a person who has grasped the entire subconsciousness of the postulates assimilated since childhood of a faith in the infallibility of Bolshevik ideals becomes tortured and seeks a way out of the blind alley of doubts.

The pain was expressed outwardly for the first time when at one of the meetings in high military circles he proposed replacing the system of political bodies with a structure of political information and social protection. Volkogonov was accused of anti-Soviet views and soon thereafter was removed from his post. A second accusation followed after a review of the results of the work done by the collective of the Military History Institute under his leadership on a ten-volume set devoted to World War II. Even the first volume was branded by a state commission of marshals and workers from the CPSU Central Committee as "seditious" and "false" for the fact that the authors had dared to correctly show the unpreparedness of the nation for war against Nazi Germany; the errors of Stalin; the criminal extermination of the finest military personnel, to the complete delight of the Nazi staffs; and the strategic inability of the commanders with views dating back to the Civil War times and who were appointed to crucial sectors with the result of the severest losses from the first days of military operations, when the entire burden of paying for the Stalinist despotism was placed on the shoulders of the people. During an "analysis" of the first volume, Volkogonov was accused of everything "heinous" and "earthly." Of course, the work was judged as "defamatory" and distorting the heroic history of the CPSU. Volkogonov began to receive letters with abuse and threats. With bitterness he recognized their authors as his former friends.

Reading these evil lines brought bitterness, and yes, he like the others, had actually been misled in doing a good deal to strengthen the amoral power. This was a difficult inner process of rethinking fate, when castles were destroyed in the heart. "Stalin," the first work written by Volkogonov at his own inner urging even before pere-stroyka, did not have the slightest chance of reaching the

readers. It was only in the period of Gorbachev glasnost that finally the opportunity appeared to set to a long planned idea of creating a triptych of psychological portraits of Stalin, Trotsky and Lenin using the examples of the history of their political adventures. Soon thereafter, another degree of doctor of historical sciences was added to that of doctor of philosophy.

Without having access to the complete materials, the scientist experienced doubts over the possibility of a complete historical assessment of the figures of the "leaders of the world proletariat." How many times did he have to turn to Boldin, Falin and the other party officials with a request to gain the right to work with the archives. In response came knowing smiles and promises but as before the "holy of holies" remained under the seven seals. But truth cannot be condemned to life imprisonment. "Stalin" came out and soon thereafter the two-volume "Trotsky" would appear on the bookshelves, and in the following year the readers would receive the main work of the trilogy "Vozhdi" [Leaders], "Lenin," also in two volumes. As we were told by Dmitriy Antonovich, these six volumes from the series "Vozhdi" possibly will be the chief undertaking of his entire life! He is well aware of how much indignation his books have caused among the people who as before are still under the sway of the old delusions. Having more than once felt the storm of rebukes against him, he understood the main thing that sooner or later the light without fail will show the reason of those who refused to be deceived against their will. For this reason Volkogonov does not hold a grudge against the hard comments directed at him...

At the last party congress, Volkogonov was not afraid to state that the CPSU would meet the same fate as the Eastern European parties, if it did not promptly set out on the road of social democracy and did not abandon the myths of the communist utopia. He did not end with the traditional applause. As always, the "political culture" and impatience of the audience were demonstrated, as for long years they had grown accustomed to the official lie.

After Volkogonov was removed from the leadership of the Military History Institute by the efforts of the party functionaries, Yeltsin invited him to work with him. Before the very eyes of his adviser, Yeltsin began to grow and develop as a statesman.

"Previously I have been involved with many leaders, but in none have I encountered a desire to constantly learn as Boris Nikolayevich has," said D.A. Volkogonov. "I have often observed how in the Consultative Council or during talks, he constantly takes notes and I am certain that later everything will be employed in his work."

In Yeltsin, Volkogonov values his openness and amazing courage. Even before the August events, before Yeltsin's flight to Yakutsk, several telegrams were received with a

warning of a bomb placed in the aircraft. Those present, including Volkogonov, tried to talk Yeltsin into putting off the flight.

"They simply want to frighten me. But that won't work," argued Boris Nikolayevich calmly.

No one knows what he was thinking during the 10-hour flight from Moscow to Yakutsk!

"How much the people of Russia have lost," we were told by Dmitriy Antonovich, "from the fact that its two outstanding democrat-politicians—Yeltsin and Gorbachev—have been unable to sincerely shake each other's hand. The misfortune for Gorbachev has been that he was unable to free himself from the pressure of the Central Committee members, the Politburo and the conservatives, and all the time his place was somewhere to the right of center. If approximately in 1989, he had sided with Yeltsin, the turn of events in the nation could have been different!

At present the scientist combines practical work with the scientific and the night is devoted to the latter. And if one considers the severe ailment for which Dmitriy Antonovich twice was on the operating table, then this is a clear civil deed. He is not ambitious. He has repeatedly turned down high state positions, not wanting to run for the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet. He told us that he dreams of only one position, that of a free artist who is not dependent upon anyone's decisions.

During the days of the putsch, Volkogonov was in a hospital in Oxford. After the difficult operation, he immediately became involved in the course of the alarming events in far-off, troubled Russia. Over the channels of BBC and by telefax, he appealed to the Army personnel and to the Russian leader, and he advised seeking out support in the Army mass among the middle and junior command personnel who shared democratic views. A week after the operation, he was already in the White House.

Volkogonov is well known in the scientific world. The lectures given by him in the universities of many countries have made his name popular. Volkogonov's professional potential was correctly judged by the president. The counselor for defense questions is a convinced supporter of the reforms. Their success, in his opinion, depends upon an adjustment of tactics, upon the strengthening of the government with experienced practical workers, upon improving taxation and instilling elementary order in society. In understanding the historical causality of the centrifugal nature of the processes in the CIS, Volkogonov is certain that after a certain time the centripetal trends will also grow stronger.

"It cannot be otherwise," he argues, "as for centuries we lived in a cultural, ethnic and economic unity. The course of reforms is threatened by economic collapse, by the monster of nationalism and by the attempt at a Thermidor; if we do not handle these dangers, the nation can be pitched back into the past!"

In Parliament, the left-of-center bloc of intellectuals with Volkogonov among its leaders, calmly and without showy trips to the microphone, defends the policy of reforms.

At present Dmitriy Antonovich has been appointed chairman of the Commission on Establishing the Army and the Ministry of Defense. The Army on the territory of the Federation, in Germany, Poland, Mongolia, the Baltic, the Transcaucasus and in those republics where there are units which are not part of the national formations of the sovereign states, will be put under Russian jurisdiction. Over time the army will be reduced to a reasonable limit of from 1.5 million men to 1.25 million. The combat capability and mobility of the Armed Forces can be comprised of units manned by professional military who in time will be attracted to service, chiefly on a contract basis. By selling surplus weapons it will be possible to fully supply housing to the officers to be discharged. Not one of them should be hurt either morally or in property terms. Volkogonov feels this.

D.A. Volkogonov, who has traveled a progressing path from orthodox Marxist views to a sober, independent thinking, does not idealize the current powers-that-be with their swings and frequent incompetence. But at the same time he understands that a period of constructive changes in the life of society is inevitably accompanied by costs inherent to the transitional period. As a history scholar, he relies on the experience of social development and puts his hopes on the strengthening in political life of the centrist forces which would bring together all political currents. The failure of February 1917 is all the more instructive, D.A. Volkogonov feels, as the fight of the left and right wings gave birth to tragic October. Only the left-of-center movement was capable of bringing the long-awaited well-being to society! By all his activities the scientist endeavors to unite the efforts of the Russian authorities on this platform—as here is our common motherland, Russia, here are our homes, our sky and land...

...Telephones are ringing in the office. Dmitriy Antonovich has no more time to speak with us and no time to think about his health. Quiet awaits him only at home where his wife, two daughters and two grandchildren are concerned for his irrepressible life. He, an adoring father and grandfather, sincerely tries to give attention to them. Incidentally, the pay for a presidential counselor is only 2,500 rubles. The guards of the building where he works earn over 3,000. An excellent reason for skeptics to wonder for what reason would this man jeopardize the most precious thing given to us by God, our own health!

Col-Gen Burlakov on Withdrawal from Germany

92UM1076A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 May 92 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Western Group of Forces Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General Matvey Prokopyevich Burlakov by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Editor-in-Chief

Valentin Logunov: "The Withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces From Germany Is an Unprecedented Operation in Military Practice," Stated Western Group of Forces Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General Matvey Burlakov in an Interview with ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Editor-in-Chief Valentin Logunov"]

[Text] As we have already reported, a parliamentary delegation headed by Russian Supreme Soviet First Deputy Chairman Sergey Filatov recently returned from the Western Group of Forces [WGF] (Germany). ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's editor-in-chief was a member of the group. During his stay in Germany, he met with Colonel-General Matvey Burlakov.

[Logunov] Matvey Prokopyevich, you head our largest military formation outside the CIS. Unfortunately, the curtain of secrecy that shrouded everything associated with the army until recently has resulted in the fact that citizens know little about the Western Group of Forces.

[Burlakov] You are correct, excessive secrecy does, at times, do more harm than good. The Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany Supreme Commander's Order No. 1 was issued on 9 June 1945, and this date was considered to be the date of the formation of the WGF. And so, the group will be 47 years old in June 1992.

Its history reflects all the periods of the complex and contradictory postwar development from the Cold War to the perestroika of international relations, the unification of Germany and the establishment of new partner relations between our countries.

The Group of Soviet Occupation Forces field headquarters was formed based on the 1st Byelarusian Front field headquarters. Many armies and division-sized and smaller units of the 1st and 2nd Byelarusian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts, which had become famous in battles and engagements, became part of the group of forces. More than half of them carried the title of Guards and honorary name designations and had combat awards. Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov was the first commander-in-chief of the group of forces. In various years, famous military leaders of the Great Patriotic War—Sokolovskiy, Chuykov, Zakharov, Konev and others—commanded the group of forces.

In March 1954, the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces was transformed into the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSFG] as a result of the conclusion of a peace treaty between the USSR and GDR. In June 1989, the GSFG was renamed the Western Group of Forces.

At the moment the Treaty on the Temporary Presence and Systematic Withdrawal of our forces from the FRG territory went into force on 12 October 1990, WGF strength totaled 546,200 people, including 337,800 servicemen. There were 115,000 pieces of equipment and weaponry in its inventory, including 4,197 tanks, 11,500 various armored combat vehicles, and 3,716 artillery pieces of various calibers. Furthermore, there were more than 2,500,000 tonnes of materiel. The group consisted

of the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies, the 3rd, 8th and 20th Guards Combined Arms Armies, and the 16th Air Army. Besides the six combat armies, there was another very important "army" in the group, 89,000 of our children, of whom 40,000 are school students.

We are tasked with redeploying this large cumbersome object to our Homeland in a rather limited period of time—30 percent per year from 1991-1993 and 10 percent in 1994.

[Logunov] It is an unprecedented task. How will you carry it out?

[Burlakov] World military practice does not know very much about similar troop redeployment operations. The withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from Germany exceeds the scale of the World War II troop deployments to the Far East or to the Persian Gulf during last year's crisis in the Middle East.

Already from the first weeks of the withdrawal, we have encountered a series of problems. One of the most serious is the transit of troops across Polish territory. The Polish government advanced one-sided financial terms, having thereby created a threat to the timely fulfillment of the treaty obligations. We could not accept those terms and, after discussing various alternatives, we decided to plan the troop and freight withdrawal primarily by sea.

Indeed, in the first stage I doubted the possibility of realizing the plan. That required enormous efforts and the initiative of commanders and all of the group's servicemen, the support of governments, primarily Russia, and help from the German side.

Thanks to these joint efforts, the 1991 withdrawal plan was totally completed. A total of 165,000 people left German territory, including 110,000 servicemen, 34,500 pieces of equipment and weaponry, and 781,000 tonnes of materiel. This comprises 30 percent of the troops and equipment planned for withdrawal.

We are maintaining that withdrawal rate this year. The number of withdrawing troops and reserves also comprise a third of the total amount. In all, more than 160,000 people, including more than 100,000 servicemen, and about 33,600 pieces of equipment will be withdrawn. We also plan to withdraw 730,700 tonnes of reserve materiel. We plan to hand over 158 military facilities and other "facilities" and 11 airfields.

While carrying out the troop withdrawal, we are considering the desires of the federal, land, and local authorities. In the near future, our troops will leave the cities of Dresden, Leipzig, Jena, Weimar, Perleberg and a number of others.

[Logunov] How do you assess the morale of the officers and soldiers?

[Burlakov] As healthy. And the level of combat readiness, troop proficiency, and military discipline, as well as

the fulfillment of the withdrawal plan and schedules graphically demonstrate that. Soldiers and sergeants, warrant officers and officers are selflessly, with great expenditure of physical and moral strength, successfully carrying out the tasks assigned to them, as it should be in a healthy military collective and, incidentally, in an interethnic collective. Representatives of over 70 nationalities serve in the WGF, 49 percent of them are Russian, 22 percent are Ukrainian, and five percent are Byelorussian. However, we have no interethnic conflicts.

Conscripts are cheerfully returning to the Homeland. Really, when a soldier serves abroad, his parents, girl friend, and friends do not come to visit. It is easier to serve closer to home.

As for officers and warrant officers, here everything is more difficult. Those who have apartments in the Homeland are returning without any special anxiety or worries. But of course it will be very difficult to survive for those who do not have housing. And the situation with housing for servicemen is not improving for the time being.

We also cannot be silent about the impact on people's morale of that fact that the CIS countries are forming their own armies. The uncertainty with army manning, with pensions for servicemen, and other social confusion are having a negative impact on the peoples' frame of mind. And questions arise among servicemen to which the political leaders of Russia and the other CIS countries must provide answers.

We would like to know which specific officials are personally responsible for not providing housing to officers without apartments? With the reduction of the Armed Forces, what will be the socio-legal protection for those officers who do not have sufficient time in service?

All of us military personnel already once swore an oath to our Fatherland and to the Soviet peoples. And we have been true to that oath. Therefore, I do not think it is necessary to repeat the oath. Indeed, the collective in the Western Group of Forces is interethnic. The newly arrived young conscripts must certainly swear allegiance to Russia.

[Logunov] And how do you assess the attitude of the citizens of united Germany toward the troops that are subordinate to you?

[Burlakov] On the whole, they have the nature of mutual understanding and constructive cooperation. Due to the agreements which have been reached, WGF servicemen and their family members will live and work in a united Germany for a definite period of time. And we want to leave Germany as its good friends. Today, we can speak with total certainty of a new stage in relations between the FRG and Russia and the other Commonwealth states. We are also trying to make our contribution to the formation of these mutual relations. Ties with various federal and land administrative organs are becoming firmly established. Good partner relations have been established with the Bundeswehr. I have repeatedly

stressed my high assessment to the Bundeswehr WGF Liaison Department headed by Major General H. Ferch. The Bundeswehr transportation service, the local authorities, and the police are rendering practical assistance in the areas where the most intensive troop traffic and loading is occurring.

We are solving a multitude of problems that confront us thanks to this businesslike cooperation.

We are trying to establish good personal contacts along with businesslike, official contacts. For example, in 1991, a large-scale activity—"Christmas in German Families" took place, during which hundreds of servicemen were invited into the homes of German citizens.

[Logunov] They tell me that you were also the guest of a German family.

[Burlakov] General Ferch's family invited me and my wife... In general, in 1991 alone, more than 200,000 Bundeswehr servicemen and residents of both the eastern and the western lands of FRG visited 50 garrisons. We are systematically conducting press conferences and seminars for representatives of the mass media and we are meeting with officers from the American and British groups of forces in the FRG.

I want to stress the value of these steps. Essentially, we here in the FRG are beginning to nurture the seedlings of new mutual relations between our armies and, in the big picture, this is the beginning of the practical movement along the path of Russia's integration into the western world. It is here in direct contacts with people that we can definitely talk about a choice in favor of agreement and cooperation, about learning from the lessons of our tragic past, and the desire to not repeat mistakes.

However, we cannot bypass the fact that, against the background of a quite favorable overall atmosphere, we are noting a definite rash of violations of the law by the local population with regard to our servicemen. In 1990, there were 163 violations of the law, there were 277 in 1991, and there have already been 69 in the first four months of this year. The totals are: 16 people have been killed and 70 have received injuries of varying severity. Provocative proposals about the sale of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment have not ceased. We think that we cannot permit good nature in an atmosphere of a rash of right-wing radicalism, Neo-Nazism and simply an increase of crime.

[Logunov] The primary mission for the WGF is the troop withdrawal. But how is combat training being carried out?

[Burlakov] The tense rhythm of combat training and the serious attitude of all servicemen toward increasing their professional expertise—is one of the characteristic traits and, I would even say, traditions of the Group of Forces. Sixteen training days per month are allocated to combat training. The remaining days are utilized for standing duty on daily details, servicing weapons and equipment,

vehicle maintenance and vehicle servicing and inspection days, work on the restoration of training facilities, and also for days off and holidays.

A number of peculiarities have appeared in combat training with the unification of Germany and the initiation of the gradual withdrawal of troops. First of all, some restrictions have been introduced in accordance with the treaty. Among them is a ban on any military activities outside the real estate of our facilities, and also those activities involving more than 13,000 participants. Aircraft sorties are not conducted on days off or on holidays in the FRG. Night flying is conducted only twice per week on work days and planned combat training exercises are banned for three months at units subject to withdrawal.

While considering that combat training exercises cause some inconveniences for the local population, I decided to reduce their intensity and to significantly reduce noise levels. For example, we have established a minimum flying altitude of 600 meters in flying training and we have prohibited tank crewmen from firing regular combat rounds from tank weapons. We have abandoned regimental-level tactical exercises (although such exercises are authorized by the treaty). We have totally banned the use of previously active tank routes. We have reduced the time period for conducting firing, especially at night, by two hours, and right now night firing is being terminated at 24:00 hours.

Ground forces field training of division-sized and smaller units is being carried out at 44 ranges at which range equipment and simulators have been installed. We are preparing to dismantle the ranges and training facilities of the troops being withdrawn in accordance with the schedule and we are recultivating the lands and preparing them for transfer to the local authorities.

A total of nearly 50 ranges and firing ranges have been closed for use, recultivated and transferred to the German side. In 1992, we plan to close and transfer another 10 ranges and firing ranges. Primary attention in combat training is being devoted to increasing the professionalism of servicemen and the combat teamwork training of units and subunits.

[Logunov] I will pose a painful question... What is your attitude toward the fact that the group's best, one could say, elite units are at times being disbanded and their combat history and their history is ended with that?

[Burlakov] Yes, this is our pain. And how here can we not recall 1917, with its hasty decisions on disbanding regiments of the Russian Army. At that time, we were deprived of part of our historical and cultural legacy. Therefore, I cannot look on indifferently as regiments, divisions, and even armies are being disbanded whose valor and courage captivated the world.

In 1991, in accordance with the plan, we withdrew and deployed in Ukraine a number of celebrated division-sized and smaller units. This year, as a result of the transfer of the Western Group of Forces to Russian jurisdiction, we plan to withdraw division-sized and smaller units onto Russian Federation territory.

As a result of the difficulties with the housing problem (in a number of locations, there simply is no place to receive them), some division-sized units must be disbanded here, in Germany. Each time this is a forced decision. But look at what units we are depriving ourselves of. The 8th Guards Army (the former 62nd), which stood to the death for 125 days in the Battle for the Volga, has been disbanded. One of the regiments of 9th Tank Division, which was one of the first to receive the rank of Guards in 1941, has been disbanded. This is a national loss and I will say this: it is also a lack of respect for our own history. It is awkward to say but it is also impossible not to say: the leadership of Volgograd Oblast has refused to quarter the staff of the 8th Guards Army in Volgograd Oblast. And the first commander of this army, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I. Chuykov, is buried in the Mamay Burial Mound!

Maybe, we will turn to foreign experience if our own experience does not teach us anything? I have in mind the following: last year, an assembly of colonels of a Scottish division rendered a decision not to recommend the reduction of its own division because of its great historical value.

It is intolerable to destroy traditions in the army because traditions are what form fighting spirit, raise a soldier's pride in his unit and division, and stresses the historical interrelationship of grandfathers, fathers, and grandsons.

[Logunov] During our stay in the Western Group of Forces, we visited many military installations. Even a cursory glance indicates that enormous resources were invested in their construction. How is the sale of this real estate progressing?

[Burlakov] We have built 777 military installations during the 47-year stay of Soviet troops on German soil in which there are more than 21,000 various buildings, 1,280 apartment buildings (nearly 20,000 apartments), 400 stores, more than 1,000 barracks and soldiers' mess halls, and 28 airfields. We would have liked for these physical assets to have been sold in a businesslike manner by the FRG Ministry of Finance, as stipulated by the treaty. Our experts assess this real estate, using German methods and prices, at 10.5 billion Deutsch marks. We plan to direct the money earned toward solving the social needs of servicemen, first of all for construction of housing.

We think that the issue of sales must be resolved primarily at the intergovernmental level between Germany and Russia. For our part, we propose conducting lump-sum compensation for real estate in order to exclude

unneeded large expenditures by us—for the assessment of property, and by them—for the determination of ecological damage.

The ecological damage that we have inflicted on these facilities is being taken into account in accordance with the agreement between the government of the FRG and the government of the USSR on certain transition measures (Russia has assumed responsibility for all of the obligations for the withdrawal as the successor state to the USSR on all international agreements) with the sale of real estate. But the issue of pollution of the environment is more likely not economic, but political. And I personally view it in the broad and narrow contexts. In the broad context, the problem of monetary compensation for damage inflicted to the environment must consider the damage inflicted on us by the Wehrmacht during the last war. And this is more than 70,000 of our cities and villages that were destroyed. If you place all of this on the scales, we still don't know who owes whom or how much. Our nearly half century presence on German soil was the result of the Second World War. At that time, we arrived as victors. And that was the mandate of history.

In a narrow context, ecology is the state of our military facilities, military vehicle motor pools, and training centers. We have conducted recultivation of the lands of firing ranges, depots, and clean-up measures of vehicle refueling facilities and, I think, we are doing that successfully. More than 20,000 men are involved with this and more than 400 engineer vehicles have been utilized to do this. But we need to keep in mind that many military facilities had been used prior to 1941 and today it is difficult to determine precisely when the damage was inflicted.

[Logunov] One more painful problem: officers, warrant officers, and, as far as I know, even some generals have nowhere to live in Russia?

[Burlakov] Housing is the most serious problem for the Western Group of Forces. More than half of the officers and warrant officers do not have apartments. Troop withdrawal rates are significantly exceeding housing construction rates. In 1991, 15,000 officers and warrant officers without apartments left Germany. And nearly 2,000 apartments were handed over during that time. This year, we expect to withdraw another 20,000 such families.

Where will they live?

By 1994, 36,421 apartments (27,736 in Russia, 2,800 in Ukraine, and 5,985 in Byelarus) will be built using 7.8 billion marks allocated by the FRG government. But they will not totally eliminate the housing problem. Another 19,000 families without apartments will remain. Furthermore, add to that number the 5,000 people who have apartments in the Baltic republics, the Transcaucasus, and a number of other regions. Yes and the WGF servicemen who are returning home do not

always receive vouchers during the distribution of apartments that have been built in accordance with the treaty with Germany.

We are developing variations right now: acquisition of housing by servicemen for their personal hard currency resources and WGF outside budget resources. There is also an appropriate Russian Governmental decree on this score. But the local Russian authorities are creating all sorts of red tape for the construction of housing in Russia by foreign firms! Land for construction is not being allocated in a timely manner, decisions that have already been made are being rescinded, and some obshchinas [oblast soviets] are in general refusing to accept the units that are being withdrawn.

[Logunov] The government of the FRG has allocated 200 million Deutsch marks for retraining servicemen and members of their families. How are these funds being used?

[Burlakov] This sum has been distributed as follows: 129.32 million marks—to the Russian Federation, 22.98 million marks—to Ukraine, 8.21 million marks to Belarus, and 3.61 million marks to Kazakhstan. The retraining of released servicemen will be conducted at the appropriate retraining centers with the indicated funds and 22.8 million marks will be used to organize and conduct courses directly in the WGF. Twenty six facilities have been designated in which training classes will be gradually initiated, while considering the troop withdrawal schedule. First of all, we have organized training at those garrisons from which the troop withdrawals are occurring. Altogether we plan to retrain nearly 10,000 officers. Servicemen and their family members are studying the subjects of small enterprise management, management, and computer operations. I hope that the courses will permit many WGF servicemen who have been released into the reserve to become actively involved in work activities.

[Logunov] In 1990, when "capitalism reached the gates of the WGF barracks," much was written about desertion. They nearly talked about the possibility of mass desertions to the West. Are very many deserting?

[Burlakov] You know, these reports surprise us. At that, very often these "hoaxes" are borrowed from the tabloid German press and references are often made to a certain Lawyer O. Lyamin who has a quite vague idea about service in the WGF.

I will say in all honesty: all of these fabrications proceed from the sphere of unhealthy fantasy that has been engendered by the Cold War and in some places simply in pursuit of a sensation. Right now we have more than 200 men who have not returned to their units. Nearly 40 percent of them have committed various types of crimes and should have appeared in court. While attempting to evade just punishment, they have deserted and are requesting political asylum from the German authorities under various pretenses.

While speaking on this topic, we cannot bypass in silence one very important issue—the juridical procedure associated with granting political asylum in Germany. Right now, this issue is being widely discussed by the FRG parliament, politicians, and society. It is a question of the adequately liberal laws for refugees that permit not only honest people, but also criminals, to temporarily reside in Germany and take advantage of the patronage of the authorities.

According to the stories of those who are returning, our fellow countrymen are enduring with extreme difficulty the stay in resettlement camps and in temporary apartments without civil rights and without the opportunity to work. They are aliens there and aliens here.

Frankly speaking, cases of desertion do not particularly concern us. These deserters are a very insignificant part of the more than 200,000 WGF servicemen. I do not think that we are losing anything or that the Germans are gaining anything.

And if something does concern us, then that is because we do not know where the missing are. Either in a resettlement camp or, as it sometimes happens, they have died outside the unit. Our desire toward the German authorities consists of the fact that we want them to provide us with information on the registration of these people with them. Then we would rid ourselves of excessive worries and we could also tell the parents about the fates of their sons.

[Logunov] Perhaps, the last question, Matvey Prokopyevich: can you talk about the work of the Russian Federation parliamentary group in the WGF?

[Burlakov] First of all, we sensed the rapt attention and responsible approach of the Supreme Soviet and the President of Russia toward the life of the armed forces on the whole and the fate of the Western Group of Forces in particular. The position of the Supreme Soviet and the Russian Federation President on the creation of the Russian Army, and the WGF armies, division-sized and smaller units place and role in it, has been clarified. The parliamentary group's visit to the WGF helped to eliminate a certain tension in military collectives.

We are grateful to the Russian parliamentarians for creating the atmosphere of goodwill in which the meetings with group personnel occurred, for the sincere compassion toward our problems, and for the responsible search for ways to resolve them. And we hope very much that the Russian Supreme Soviet, while relying on the opinion of WGF soldiers and the conclusions of the parliamentary group, will make the required decisions, including on increasing the level of socio-legal protection of officers, warrant officers, and their family members, so that the cadre potential of the Russian army is not lessened and we retain junior officers. It would be advisable to meet again in six months and to mutually account for the realization of the planned measures.

Well, while taking advantage of this meeting and the conversation with the editor-in-chief of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, I would like to wish its readers: Keep your spirits up during this difficult stage in Russia's development. There has never been such a stage in our history. We will survive and we will be revitalized.

Lobov on His Removal, Russian Army

92UM1094A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jun 92 p 2

[Interview with former USSR Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff General of the Army Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov by A. Chernyak: "'The Army Is Needed To Prevent War' The Last USSR Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff Reflects on the Present and Future Russian Armed Forces"]

[Text] Let me introduce my interviewee. General of the Army Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov did not bypass a single rung of the service ladder. He was a soldier, a military school cadet, and commander of a platoon, company, battalion, regiment, division, and army. He commanded a military district and was first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and then chief of staff of the Warsaw Treaty Countries Allied Armed Forces and head of the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze. In August 1991, he became the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces—first deputy USSR Minister of Defense. He is a doctor of military sciences, professor, and author of many scientific works on military organizational development. He is well-known for this democratic views.

[Chernyak] Vladimir Nikolayevich, in December 1991 by an decree of the then still president of the USSR, you were, unexpectedly for everyone and without explanation of the reasons, removed from the post of chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. At that time, PRAVDA wrote about that. Did something happen?

[Lobov] Nothing. I can only guess about the true motives for what happened. It seems that it was palace intrigues. Yes, I have my point of view with regard to military reform. But is that really bad? I aggressively defended the idea of a civilian ministry of defense and of a more precise delimitation of the functions between it and the General Staff. We have actually come to that!

Moreover, I have always said and will say what I am thinking. I am also saying this today: a very serious threat currently exists during the resolution of global issues of the organizational development of the Russian Army to replace the vitally needed radical military reform with the political state of affairs and demagoguery. The aspiration of certain persons to use any means to fall into step with the president, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of Defense in defining the strategy of military organizational development can only harm the cause. And there have already been such cases.

[Chernyak] Since we have begun talking about reform, let us talk a bit about this. There are already no Allied

Armed Forces. Practically every state that is part of the CIS is building its own army. The division of military equipment, weapons, armies and fleets is occurring. Russia is creating armed forces and a Ministry of Defense. How do you assess all of that?

[Lobov] Now it is already absolutely clear: the formation of the CIS should have begun first of all with the most painstaking development of military issues. Why? We have followed the old diagram, having concentrated our attention on politics and economics. And at that time we had forgotten altogether about the army which concentrates in itself all of the diversity of the political, socio-economic and other ties. A united army permeated all of the structures of the former USSR with thousands of threads. It was impossible to chop it down with one stroke. By being in a hurry, we lost the historic chance to competently form allied armed forces and to somewhat painlessly and smoothly resolve the issues of national political and economic sovereignties. The people would have suffered like this. It is clear that the expert predictive assessments of the consequences of the decisions made at that time on military issues were made quite primitively. The human tragedies are confirmation of that. Now we need to proceed from what we have.

[Chernyak] And the reality is such: today the army really needs protection. First Lieutenant Oleg Sorokin was in the editorial offices. He graduated from Kiev Higher Military School in 1988. He served in Baku. Right now a national army is being formed there. There is no place for him in it. And he wants to continue to serve...

[Lobov] And there are thousands of these fates! Therefore, I repeat, this aspect was not thought through during the formation of the CIS. There were many dozens of union ministries in the country. They have reduced or reformed them but they did not touch the military administrative structures, it was as if they could reform themselves. But you cannot deceive the reality of life. You know, I still do not understand why we stated that Russia is forming its own army when the latter are compelling Russia to do that. But would it not be more correct for the former? As they say, the process has moved toward that. And I think that this step would have been understood and justified.

[Chernyak] How do you currently see, in the most general terms, the concept of the organizational development of Russia's armed forces?

[Lobov] I think that it is right now that Russia as never before needs peace. The country is in the stage of the most complicated socio-political evolutions. The old structures have been destroyed. The new structures are just being formed. The state is weak in all of its levels. And here there are a series of internal and external factors which could cause a definite temptation for someone. It is not by chance that hints are being heard that, they say, we can be taken using bare hands. And the fact that today Russia has actively undertaken the organizational development of its own army attests to the

realistic understanding of the situation by both the president and the government. All of this are concrete steps in the direction needed by the country. And they are not being taken on virgin soil. I, in my capacity as chief of the General Staff, along with a large group of scholars and practitioners had the opportunity to become involved with interesting theoretical conceptual elaborations that have already existed for a long time. And I am glad that interest has currently been manifested in them and that they are being used.

In my opinion, the effectiveness of the organizational development of the new Russian Army must be based on several basic provisions. First of all, here much will depend on the people who form Russia's external and internal military policy. The second factor is economic. We have entered into market relations and it is impossible to build a new army without considering this factor. Third—the state of the social environment, society. Well, the fourth factor is external, the military changes surrounding us.

In all of this, we must proceed first of all from Russia's interests. And Russia has enormous, global interests. Having become the successor to the USSR, Russia in its new appearance is part of the system of the current world order. And its military policy plays far from the last role here.

[Chernyak] Vladimir Nikolayevich, and what, in your opinion, today has the most important significance for Russian military policy?

[Lobov] The development of the new military doctrine, the precise definition of its basis, and its priorities under new conditions. The most difficult work is here. And if we have more or less defined it with a foreign power that is far away, than it is more difficult to define it with one that is near. How do we regard both Ukraine, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and the other CIS countries who are conducting their own internal and external military policy? We are still not unlike fellow countrymen and at the same time—independence states that are allied in a commonwealth. Russia has to clearly and precisely promulgate its positions in the new doctrine and also, of course, in its strategy. Here we have to break down many views. Why do we need to agree with the fact that war is the continuation of policy by other means? Why is the preparation for war and the conduct of war in both the doctrines, the strategies, and in everything else? Is that correct? In my opinion, it isn't.

We need an army not for war but for its prevention. The understanding of Russia's military strategy must also be fundamentally changed. I think that today strategy is the science and practice of the realization of the state's opportunities to achieve the goals assigned by policy. Hence, the formula: policy assigns the goal of preventing any war and realizes all of the capabilities of the state—political, economic, diplomatic, social, military—to achieve this goal ...

[Chernyak] While proceeding from this, how do you see the new Russian army?

[Lobov] As a mobile army, equipped with modern equipment, professionally manned, and capable of being the guarantor for the prevention of any wars and conflicts. Capable of conducting military operations under any conditions. At the same time, it must be economical for Russia.

[Chernyak] Is that in general? And if specifically?

[Lobov] The Ministry of Defense is civilian. It manages military industry, construction, social policy, and rear services. The General Staff is the organ of direct operational command and control of the troops. It is advisable for both the minister of defense and the chief of the General Staff to be directly subordinate to the president and to be his main advisors on military-political issues.

I especially want to say this about the services of the armed forces. The shift to a market economy has engendered a great deal of confusion in military industry. It has largely "withdrawn" from the military. Arms are beginning to decline. I think that the armed forces services commanders must also be directly subordinate to the president and defend their interests to him, the government, and the Supreme Soviet. This approach will provide the opportunity to rationally and effectively finance the army and the military programs that are vitally necessary for Russia. Life prompts that it is more rational to have brigades and corps than divisions and armies. This will provide a colossal savings in manpower and resources and will increase troop mobility and their might. We have the most enormous administrative structure. It is sometimes reduced to the absurd—there are more administrators than executors.

The organizational development of the new Russian army must entail radical changes in manning, training, and in personnel policy. We often hear: there are many generals and colonels in the army. And if we intelligently conduct reform of military ranks, there will be fewer and the main thing—millions in saved resources will appear. We need to use these resources, along with those released from purchases of arms and the construction of military facilities due to the reduction, in the interests of the people.

[Chernyak] You touched upon the social aspect of army life, what here will not endure delay?

[Lobov] In the current economic situation, it is entirely clear that it will be difficult for Russia to maintain such enormous armed forces. And today's largest political task is to find the only true formula for reduction. I see the solution in the creation of an active officer reserve. A man, say, who has served 15 years and who has an apartment, wants to leave the army. Please. We pay him for his post five years ahead, that is, until that time when on his 20th anniversary he automatically begins to receive a pension. Consider that he will work for the benefit of society for those five years. The savings and

the benefit for the country and the army are colossal. The man has left the army well-to-do. But we know: at the drop of a hat, he is in ranks.

Now—about officer housing. Right now there are nearly 200,000 officers without apartments in Russia. There are variations for resolving this problem. For example, one of them is this: the annual output from academies and schools—50,000-60,000. Annual release throughout Russia—somewhere around 60,000. Consequently, we need 120,000 apartments per year. Where is the solution for the next two-three years? I think we need to freeze graduations from the academies and schools for a year and not conduct a new selection of cadets and students. This will provide the opportunity to gain time to repay apartment debts to the people and to not generate new lines of those who won't have a roof over their heads.

[Chernyak] Are you, as before, "unemployed"?

[Lobov] For now—yes. But, as before, I am ready to render assistance to those who are conducting military reform in any role.

Baku Troops Demand Withdrawal

92UM1088B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 May 92 p 3

[Unattributed Article, under the rubric: "NEGA Reports": "The Army"]

[Text] NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has already recently reported on the visit to Moscow of the Baku division officers who transmitted demands for the most rapid withdrawal of the division from Azerbaijan to Russian authorities and CIS command authorities. At the meeting with Commander-in-Chief Shaposhnikov, they were assured that the troops will be withdrawn to Russia by the end of the year along with the families of the servicemen and their property. Furthermore, an order was issued on the transfer of part of the division's equipment and arms to the Azerbaijan Republic. During the time that has passed since then, we have learned that no promises whatsoever are practically being carried out other than the transfer of equipment. Obstacles are even being put in the way of the shipment of the servicemen's things. Division officers have decided to cease transferring equipment and weapons to the Azerbaijanis until the complete withdrawal of their families and property to Russia.

Committee on Defense of Servicemen Formed

92UM1090B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 May 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "One More Organization Under the Russian Armed Forces?"]

[Text] The recently established council of state and public structures of the Russian Federation on problems of social protection for military servicemen discharged

into the reserves and their families held its first meeting yesterday under the leadership of Nikolay Stolyarov, chairman of the Committee for Work With Personnel of the CIS Unified Armed Forces.

A draft statute on the council was approved at the meeting, and a decision was made to create a commission to draw up the council's charter determining its political status, goals and objectives.

Apparently the new council will operate under the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Soviet, in regard to which, in Stolyarov's words, there was "preliminary discussion with Khasbulatov."

Officer Assembly Coordinating Council Meets

92UM1090A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 May 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Officer Assembly Coordinating Council Offers Recommendations to Government"]

[Text] Problems concerned with social and legal protection of military servicemen discharged into the reserves and their families on Russian territory, and of servicemen serving outside the Russian Federation, were discussed at a meeting of the Coordinating Council of the Officer Assembly held yesterday in the Central Palace of the Soviet Army. Those in attendance were acquainted with the state of affairs in the Baltics, in the Transcaucasus and in the Black Sea Fleet by delegates from the corresponding regions. In the words of Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Mochaykin, chairman of the Coordinating Council, the council has drawn up a large number of projects, decrees, instructions and orders for the commander-in-chief of the CIS Unified Armed Forces and the Russian Federation's defense minister on these issues "as recommendations."

Representatives of the command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs and deputies were invited to the meeting, but they did not appear, apparently siding with Pavel Grachev, who declared several days earlier that "today's officer assemblies do not correspond to the purpose of such assemblies in the Russian army. If the Russian army is to hold officer assemblies, they should be held at the regimental level...."

Training Battalion for Underwater Combat Engineers

92UM1084A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 May 92 First edition p 3

[Article by Major V. Ganzha: "The Underwater Combat Engineers: There is a Romantic Element in Their Work, But Even More There Are Difficulties"]

[Text] North Caucasus Military District—The engineer training battalion commanded by Major V. Dzhegir is

the only subunit of its kind in the General-Purpose Forces of the CIS. Underwater combat engineers are trained here. This is a fairly rare occupation in the army. And, generally speaking, the press does not overlook the military divers. It still focuses only on the romantic side, however.

Some novices were receiving their "christening" in the subunit that day. Arraying themselves in the diving gear with the help of their comrades, the first group of new soldiers were submerging themselves in the water. Incidentally, three people back up one diver in a dive: standing by, monitoring the flow of oxygen and maintaining communication.

A training pool is not a river or a lake, of course. Many things here are simplified, as they say. The gear weighs almost a quintal, however, and that is no joking matter. Nor is the excitement, completely understandable in the situation, a joking matter. Try as they might, some of the beginners could not conceal it.

"One of the main rules of diving," Major V. Musinenko said, "is not to panic and not to become fidgety under the water. Be that as it may, but deep is still deep. Steadiness and self-control are therefore extremely important for each of us. Unfortunately, we do not have a staff psychologist, although there is a great need for one. And we can only dream of a computer for conducting various tests and compiling a bank of essential data."

The expertise acquired by Major V. Dzhigir and Major B. Kozlov during years of training at the military academy and many years of practical experience enable them to handle the emotional and psychological training of the personnel perfectly professionally even without a computer, of course. They can thoroughly check out the new arrivals in the subunit for suitability for diving, let us say, and promptly correct errors made in the screening process. Just last year a couple of dozen new soldiers were transferred from the training battalion to other subunits.

In all other matters the officers, the diving instructors and their assistants have to rely only on their ability to persuade their subordinates, to influence the latter with their personal example. It is especially difficult in situations in which the novices encounter problems of a psychological nature.

Major Dzhigir is fairly blunt in his evaluations:

"I believe we have a right to expect people who already have some knowledge of diving. There are schools for this, after all. We receive literally single individuals from there, however. The rest are just random picks. The superficial, incompetent screening of draftees makes life difficult for us. And this goes on year after year. Draftees from Central Asia and the Caucasus, for example, frequently do not even know how to swim, not to speak of the fact that some of them have an inherent fear of water.

In addition, articulation is greatly altered when underwater communication equipment is used. Judge for yourself. How can one understand what a person is saying underwater when he does not even speak Russian well?

"These are far from all the problems the future divers and those who train them have to overcome, however. The cadets are clearly under extra pressure. Proper nutrition is needed. On days with classes involving dives their ration includes—hard to imagine—condensed milk, coffee, cheese, sugar, smoked sausage.... Who is going to 'pamper' soldiers with such delicacies today? No matter where we turn, our efforts are in vain. In reality the cadets receive only meat and butter."

There is also a fairly serious problem with things of a bureaucratic making. Specifically, warrant officers hold the positions of diving instructors in the training battalion. Special benefits have been established for this group of servicemen: extra rations, 45 days of leave time per year, two years of official service for each year actually served. Officers in the same situation do not enjoy these benefits. All of this is reflected in the personnel's attitude toward the job. One only has to look at a table prepared by the battalion chief of staff and compare the data for the past two years to see this. It shows that the majority of officers with time in service and experience have been drawn less and less to the mysterious depths lately.

At the same time there is a great demand for underwater specialists. They are not allowed to be bored in idleness. They retrieve rigging from barges sunk back during the war, raise aircraft from the bottom of the sea and perform many other missions.

The officers feel that quality training of the specialists requires a training facility with classrooms and simulators, and a pressure chamber for treating specific sicknesses and performing decompression at the surface.

This is probably not the only training battalion with these problems. As we reform the military, we need to think not just about how to reduce it but also about how to create a situation in which the personnel can live normal lives and be trained professionally in the work to which they are assigned.

CIS: POLICY

Practical Failings of Kiev Military Agreements

92UM1061A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 May 92 p 5

[Article by Doctor of Juridical Sciences, Professor, and Reserve Captain 2nd Rank Gennadiy Melkov: "Russian Armed Forces or CIS Joint Forces"]

[Text] The latest meeting of the CIS Member-States heads of state occurred in Kiev on March 30, 1992 at which, among other things, 14 agreements on military

issues were signed. It would seem that a solid legal foundation has been laid under the CIS Joint Armed Forces concept and that the very functioning of the Joint Armed Forces has entered into a phase of practical implementation. However, analysis of the military-political realities, the actions of the CIS Member-States, and the documents signed in Kiev permits me to arrive at the conclusion that the functioning of the CIS Joint Armed Forces is obviously doomed to failure.

I.

The sovereign states that have emerged in place of the former USSR have assimilated well the lessons of the "tank attacks" of the common Armed Forces, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and the USSR KGB against the unarmed population in Baku, Vilnius and in Moscow. Having become sovereign states and members of the UN, they even right now continue to fear the very fact of the existence of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, seeing in them a real threat to their own sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence. And this fear and mistrust have a quite real basis under them.

Those same Ministry of Defense and General Staff generals and officers, the majority of whom actively supported the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] and CPSU, lead the CIS Joint Armed Forces. They have not only retained their posts but have even "grown," having occupied key posts in the CIS Joint Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief's closest entourage. For example, Achalov, B. Pyankov, and others.

All of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, as before, are under the total political control of the political organs and army political workers, who have only "replaced their signboards" to deputy commanders for personnel without any change whatsoever of the essence of "Party-educational work" while preserving all of the CPSU's attributes and slogans. If by September 19, 1991, there were 80,000 political workers in the USSR Armed Forces, including 389 generals, 11 higher military-political schools and one Military-Political Academy, there are 50,000 "educators"—political workers, the same number of schools and that same Military Humanitarian Academy in the new structures of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. They are guided by practically the same provisions as the former GlavPUR [Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy] and by those same military regulations which talk about the "CPSU's leading and directing role." The heads of the sovereign states will hardly entrust their national armies to these "educators."

It is also impossible to rule out the continuing attempts of CPSU advocates to use the army in the interest of restoring political power to the CPSU.

II.

The leaders of the sovereign states are afraid to trust the leadership of the CIS Joint Armed Forces which weakly

controls the Joint Armed Forces and is even deceiving the CIS Member-States heads of state. And, unfortunately, there is a real basis for that assertion.

"Wild" privatization and open seizure of the Armed Forces, military equipment and weapons that are located on the territory of the former union republics is occurring, including with the concurrence of officers of local nationalities, enormous riches are sinking into the pockets of embezzlers, including embezzlers in uniform, and not ending up in the hands of officers who have been withdrawn onto the territory of Russia along with the troops and families under the open sky.

The CIS Joint Armed Forces command authorities assert that nuclear weapons are under strictest control, but television broadcasts an interview with the commander of a mobile missile launcher who asserts that his missile, with existing "protection," could be seized by a special group; so far there has been no clarification with regard to three tactical nuclear missiles that were allegedly stolen in Kazakhstan and sold to someone. The CIS Joint Armed Forces command authorities say that there are no nuclear weapons in the Caucasus, the vice president of Russia says the reverse. The command authorities deny the presence of chemical weapons in the Caucasus but the local press rebuts that. The press reports that three diesel submarines have been sold to Iran and the Joint Armed Forces command authorities deny that. Major-General Skorokhodov asserted in the press that there is no 5.45 mm bullet for the Kalashnikov assault rifle (AK-74) with a displaced center of gravity and other design features in the USSR Armed Forces, however, documented information from Baku, Vilnius and criminal cases that has been examined by military tribunals confirms that these bullets that are banned by international law are in the inventories of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and the MVD's of all of the former union republics of the USSR.

Strategic and frontal aviation bombers "simply" fly from one CIS state to another, even seizing the regimental colors (Colonel Chernyy), while dooming the officers who have remained to the mistrust of the official authorities of the sovereign states, transforming officers' families into hostages and causing general suspicion toward officers of the Russian nationality. The 106th Heavy Bomber Division Commander Major-General Bashkurov does not find it necessary to carry out the order of the CIS Air Force commander, and two regiments of this division, by the admission of the officers, are ready to go to the wall.

III.

Mothers who are sending their sons into the army do not have a real hope for their return alive and well. The danger of being killed in "hot spots" has now been added to dedovshchina [hazing of conscripts] and zemlyachestvo [association of people from the same area]. According to press reports, soldiers are deserting from these "spots" in droves.

The existing Armed Forces manning system, which is based on the Law on Universal Military Obligation and the system of construction battalions that was legalized by RSFSR Presidential Ukase No 241, 28 November 1991, "On the Formation of the RSFSR Main Special Construction Directorate"—RSFSR Glavspetsstroy (replacing the signboard on USSR Glavspetsstroy), with the presence of the current CIS Joint Armed Forces leadership and the "educators" from the CPSU will never result in the elimination of the causes of the deaths and traumatization of servicemen and military builders in peacetime, and will not eradicate dedovshchina or zemlyachestvo no matter how the highest military leaders attempt to "combine" the territorial and extraterritorial manning principles and mandatory conscription with the contract system.

The heads of some CIS Member-States have already begun to officially recall from the Joint Armed Forces soldiers and officers of their nationality for further service in the national armed forces on their own territory. The actual situation in the troops and in the CIS countries requires the total return of Russian soldiers to Russian territory.

IV.

Conversion of the defense industry has practically not begun. "During the last six decades, from 80 to 90 percent of national resources—raw material, technical, financial, and intellectual resources—have been expended on the creation of the VPK [Military-Industrial Complex]," says Russian Presidential Advisor A. Rakitov. "The military-industrial complex is nearly synonymous with our economy and, in that very sense, conversion of the military-industrial complex—is a synonym for economic reform."

Conversion is being deliberately impeded by the general officer and military-industrial complex elite who have now been deprived of their fantastic state subsidies.

V.

Unfortunately, it is the highest military command authorities of the former USSR Ministry of Defense who today have been automatically transformed into the CIS Joint Armed Forces command authorities that are more decisively and insistently opposing radical reform of the Armed Forces and their depolitization (with real "de-Partyization") and against an immediate shift to the contract system. It is the general officer and military-industrial complex elite who oppose the total elimination of construction battalions. The least that the CIS Joint Armed Forces Central Apparatus 32,000-man officer staff agrees to—is the automatic transfer to the Russian Ministry of Defense, that is, to the total preservation of the status quo. (For comparison: there are a total of approximately 1,300 men involved with that in the NATO structures). It is these individuals who oppose the organization of a civilian Russian Ministry of Defense because only then will the Mafioso ties between the generals and the military-industrial complex be severed.

Unfortunately, the current Russian leadership is entrusting the preparation and the resolution of military issues to the highest military commanders who, of their own will, will never rid themselves of corruption, nepotism, protectionism, and Mafioso ties. As a result of personnel policies in the army, the best, through whose efforts a new professional army could be created, are leaving. But then Main Personnel Directorate Chief Yu. Rodionov "rose" from major-general to colonel-general from September through November 1991. You shouldn't be surprised by the fact that the sovereign CIS Member-States do not want and will not resign themselves to such an immoral and uncontrolled situation.

VI.

The existing CIS Joint Armed Forces are practically not controlled by either the Russian Parliament or by the parliaments of the other CIS members. Until now, precise figures for the military budget have not been published, the parliaments have never even discussed the specific items of military expenditures, experts have never verified the true situation in the Armed Forces, and no one has seriously discussed either military doctrine or military organizational development. Until now, the military-industrial complex, in and of itself, without control, plans, orders, builds and accepts military equipment and weaponry from itself, investigates accidents and disasters itself and, in its own interests, continues to "drive up" the multi-billion ruble cost of aircraft carrier-targets, whose combat effectiveness is equal to zero without modern support. It continues to build submarine-targets whose noise factor (and consequently, their detection and destruction range) exceeds the noise factor of similar American submarines by a factor of 10-80.

VII.

Half of the CIS participants who have signed the Kiev Agreements have already begun to form their own armed forces: Ukraine, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Armenia. And it cannot be a question of any CIS Joint Armed Forces whatsoever without the participation of Ukraine and Byelorussia.

While proceeding from everything that has been said, we can make the following conclusions:

First. At the current stage, the CIS Joint Armed Forces are absolutely not viable, they are a myth and exist only on paper. The Armed Forces of the former Union actually exist which are under the command of the former USSR Ministry of Defense, that has been renamed (formally) the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Military Command. The army, manned based on universal military obligation and extraterritoriality and which includes in the same military units citizens of various CIS Member-States under conditions of political instability within states and unregulated relations among the CIS states themselves, does not have a future. The collapse and elimination of this army is an objective reality.

Second. All of the sovereign CIS Member-States, with rare exceptions, will be creating and will create their own armed forces. The creation of any Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces whatsoever is possible only when the member-states acquire total political stability and their free economic development stands on the durable rails of a market economy. Until then, it is premature to talk about any allied armed forces whatsoever.

Third. Russia must immediately begin to totally create its own armed forces.

What should they be like?

The Russian Armed Forces (it is Russia and not Russian) and weapons must meet the highest world standard that corresponds to Russia's prestige and role as a great power and permanent member of the UN Security Council. They must be highly professional, highly mobile, nuclear, without construction battalions and with a strength of approximately 1,000,000 men.

Manning is exclusively on a contract basis with the provision of a high and worthy standard of living for servicemen and effective social protection with the total exclusion of any military construction formations of the existing type.

The number of officers in proportion to the rank and file servicemen and senior NCOs (sergeants) must be reduced to the worldwide level that exists in the United States and in the other NATO countries.

The following must be totally eliminated: the institution of concealed political workers and military investigators, and the military procuracy (right now the Main Military Procuracy Directorate) and military tribunals must also be totally eliminated. Special psychologists and other specialists must be hired on contract from among civilians. If necessary, the institution of regimental clergymen can be revived.

The Russian Ministry of Defense must consist of civilians and be headed by a civilian, and high command personnel must be revitalized and rejuvenated. In no case must we permit the automatic transformation of the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command into the Russian Ministry of Defense. Assignment to the highest military posts must be carried out openly and on a competitive basis while exclusively considering job and professional knowledge. We need a complete and comprehensive audit (inspection) of the qualitative and quantitative state of all the services of the armed forces and military programs, with the involvement of independent Russian military experts and people's deputies in this work. This will permit us to reduce protectionism, corruption, and nepotism to a minimum and to sever the Mafioso ties of the general officers and the military-industrial complex elite.

The creation of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Armed Forces must be placed under strict parliamentary and civilian control. Parliament must

approve a defensive military doctrine. New armed forces, that are worthy of Russia and its glorious past, must be created as soon as possible based on the defensive military doctrine. We need to do everything so that officers and extended service military personnel, who have been released into the reserve due to staff reductions, and also their families are provided with housing, an adequate exit allowance, and with the opportunity to obtain a needed civilian specialty at state expense.

P.S. The events of recent days are beginning to justify my worst fears: the army is not being reformed—it is automatically being transferred into the Russian Armed Forces; the central apparatus of the former USSR Ministry of Defense (the current CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Staff Directorate) is only changing its deployment location—it is moving into the offices of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization Allied Armed Forces Headquarters; the Russian Ministry of Defense and Russian Armed Forces General Staff "will be formed"... Instead of the anticipated reduction of the central apparatus—it will be expanded, instead of rejuvenation and competition to occupy command positions—everything will be returned to its own circles.

It was impossible to expect anything else from the state commission, the majority of which are the highest military commanders and military-industrial complex leaders who have also reduced our Armed Forces to their current crisis state.

Parliament Continues Discussion of Law "On Defense"

92UM1102A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Jun 92 First edition p 1

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank O. Odnokolenko: "The Law 'On Defense' Was Adopted at the First Reading. But Parliament Must Still Do Some Work on It"]

[Text] On 3 June, parliament adopted at the first reading the Law "On Defense", in the development of which the Parliamentary Committees on Defense and Security Policy and on Law, the President of Russia's State Legal Administration, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, and the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command participated. As one of the leading "ideologists" of the development of Russian military law People's Deputy Aleksey Tsarev stated, the deputy corps approached the discussion of the law in a constructive manner. Despite a substantial number of critical comments, both houses voted practically unanimously (94 percent). It is stressed that the draft law is not "obtuse" in nature and they can modify, supplement, and improve it during the course of military reform.

The primary provisions of the Law "On Defense" specifically provide for the reduction of the Russian Armed Forces and their command and control apparatus, a guarantee of reliable state and public control of expenditures on defense, the development and production of weapons and military equipment while considering the

new economic conditions, and a restriction of social activities in the Armed Forces without infringing upon the rights and freedoms of citizens.

According to the statement of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee on the Defense and Security Policy, already during the course of preparing the law for the first reading they managed to eliminate the majority of contradictions between the legislators and the military who are the users of this law. The only thing in which disagreements remain is with regard to the provision in accordance with which the strength of the Armed Forces should not exceed one percent of the country's population. In the opinion of military experts, a great reduction of the army at the present time is simply unrealistic and fraught with serious consequences. But the participants of the development of the draft law think that this contradiction is entirely solvable and that it can be qualified by appropriate amendments that will determine a smooth, gradual reduction of the strength of the Russian Army.

On the whole, the people's deputies perceived the provision set forth in the law on parliamentary control over the Armed Forces without objections, including the issues of cadre policy. As it has been noted, the draft law that has been adopted in its first reading with its subsequent realization assumes the substantial demilitarization of our society. While answering a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent's questions, Aleksey Tsarev specifically stressed: "We stand for putting things in order so that military service is carried out only within the Armed Forces. Right now, people in fire protection, in railroad transportation, etc., wear shoulder boards. Altogether, nearly one million men 'are serving' outside the army. Even the tax inspectors wanted to have a colonel-general on their staff..."

So, the Law "On Defense", which we talked about for so long, has acquired real contours. We assume that parliament will discuss it in the second reading in several weeks.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Illegal Sale of Metals From Baltic Fleet Examined

92UM1085A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Jun 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Gromak, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "A Copper-and-Brass Fever is Shaking the Baltic Fleet"]

[Text] Newspapers of the Baltic states, especially Latvia and Estonia, have recently abounded in reports of various illegal operations involving copper and other nonferrous metals. Recently some unknown barbarians even removed the copper from monuments to the heroic C-13 submariners in Liyepaya. Nor has the Baltic Fleet's main base been overlooked. In April of this year alone, for

example, 141 kilograms of copper wire and almost 40 kilograms of tungsten bars were stolen from the ship-repair plant headed by Captain 1st Rank L. Brychuk. Somewhat earlier 935 kilograms of copper starting sheet "was lost" from the plant; even earlier, more than a ton of it disappeared. On one fleet ship "enterprising" sailors cut off 30 kilograms of copper tubing in the night. Fleet driver N. Tartarchuk attempted to haul off three tons of copper from Baltiysk....

This is simple theft, however, criminal activity clear and simple. But how does one assess the following.

On 14 June of last year the Baltic Fleet's Section for Missiles and Artillery Armament concluded a contract with the interbranch commercial production center Konvern. And if we can believe the official record, the Baltic Fleet's ORAV [Section for Missiles and Artillery Armament] sold Konvern military property worth 96,812 rubles in October 1991. This amount was transferred to Current Account No. 203 in Kaliningrad's Central Bank. And once again, if we can believe the record, when the official assessment of the property's value was written up by the methods established by the Baltic Fleet's URAV [Directorate for Missiles and Artillery Armament], the value of the property sold was understated by a total of 20,000 rubles. Furthermore, motor vehicles and other technical equipment still suitable for use and with service life remaining were sold as manufactured items.

The MPKTs [interbranch commercial production center] Konvern subsequently turned up with a partner, a small state enterprise, The Professional Training Center at a military scientific research institute in Saint Petersburg. "It was granted the authority," Captain 1st Rank V. Tserkovnyy, the deputy head of the Baltic Fleet's ORAV, explained to the military prosecutor, "to direct production and commercial activities in the Baltic Fleet."

You will agree, this is an interesting explanation. The specialists from the commercial center explained the establishment of the small enterprise fairly simply. It was done, in their opinion, to avoid transferring the earnings to Account 203 and having to pay taxes.

A production section was set up in the Baltic Fleet's ORAV from the Professional Training Center MGP [small state enterprise], with G. Bezrodnyy, an employee in the section, as its director. The wife of Capt 1st Rank V. Tserkovnyy, deputy head of the section, was bookkeeper for the production section. A special account was opened in a commercial bank, into which money from the sale of the property was now transferred. The production section sold military property, including nonferrous metals, in the fleet and also sent it to the Professional Training Center. The sale of nonferrous metals to commercial organizations in Estonia was carried out from the artillery base in Tallin. For example, on 9 January G. Bezrodnyy and the production and construction cooperative Barion (in Tallin) concluded a contract

for the sale of 2,600 kilograms of copper at 5,000 rubles per ton. G. Bezrodnny did explain to military justice agencies, to be sure, that the money was never received in the section's account.

On 13 December a contract was concluded with the joint-stock company for 500 tons of ferrous-metal by-products at 500 rubles per ton. In a telegram Captain 1st Rank V. Tserkovnyy authorized the transfer of 16 tons of brass cartridge cases from one of the military units in Tallin to the Khamiskrab AO [joint-stock company]. At the same time he reminded the rear-service chief of the Tallin Naval Base of liability for violating terms of the contract between the Baltic Fleet's ORAV and the MPKTs Konvern. Under Order No. 12 of 11 November the Khamiskrab AO received 16 tons of brass cartridge cases. No one, not even the authorized agencies, has any data on how the account was settled.

On 31 November of last year the Altor joint-stock company in Tallin sold 20 tons of brass cartridge cases at 2,000 per ton. Somewhat earlier the Valestor AO in Tartu sold 10 tons of brass cartridge cases and 16 tons of ferrous metal. At the end of February of this year 15 tons of brass cartridge cases were sent to the SKR [escort vessel] Neukrotimyy in Tallin from a military unit located in Kaliningrad Oblast. Is this enough examples?

The conclusion of official agencies shows that the agreements were drawn up without a legal appraisal. And some of them, if one looks closely at the dates, were concluded just when the sale of military property had been halted by an order of the minister of defense, and Decree No. 90 issued by the government of the Russian Federation on 31 December 1991 had established the procedure for licensing and applying quotas to the import and export of goods, including ferrous and non-ferrous metals.

The price at which the metal was sold is also ridiculous. Everything was correct, however, if you follow the logic of Capt 1st Rank V. Tserkovnyy. According to Price List No. 02-05 for 1990 and still in effect, brass is worth 770-695 rubles per ton. The price given for 1991 in accordance with the instructions of the Central Finance Directorate of the Ministry of Defense is 1,155 rubles. Brass was received at the Vtorchermet base at 236 rubles per ton....

The metal was sold not to state but to commercial structures, however. And logically, the appraisals should have been based on commercial rates. The market prices for copper on the foreign market at the beginning of 1992 was 1,600-2,600 U.S. dollars per ton; the price of brass, 1,890-2,300 dollars. In the domestic market (on the Metals Exchange) the price of copper was 100,000 rubles; that of brass, 50,000. The price of ferrous metals on the foreign market was 110-125 dollars per ton; on the domestic market, up to 10,000 rubles.

I am not an investigator, and I cannot assess these facts from a legal standpoint. I can say only one thing: that the Baltic merchants in shoulder boards have made fools of

themselves again. It is up to the legal experts to say whether this was done knowingly or out of ignorance, however.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Little Progress Seen on Yeltsin's Housing Pledge

92UM1091A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jun 92 First edition p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 3rd Rank Yu. Gladkevich: "The Presidential Decree is Clear and Strict. Why Didn't They Rush to Carry it Out?"]

[Text] Our Permanent Correspondent to the Pacific Ocean Fleet Captain 1st Rank V. Shirokov has reported to the editorial offices on the decisive measures adopted by Primorskiy Kray Head of Administration V. Kuznetsov in execution of the Russian Presidential Decree "On Measures for the Reinforcement of Social Protection of Servicemen and Individuals Who Have Been Released From Military Service." They are directed at eliminating the housing debt for allocating housing to servicemen already in the first half of 1992. For this purpose, he envisions directing municipal housing that is being introduced or that has been vacated primarily to eliminate the housing debt and, if that is insufficient, to utilize, on a contract basis, Primorye city enterprise and organization housing that is being built.

This is reassuring news but, unfortunately, it is almost the only reassuring news among the reports of our permanent correspondents in the military districts and in the fleets. Much more alarming are the reports and also the letters of our readers from which it becomes clear: far from all heads of administration are disposed to act so decisively while fulfilling the presidential decree.

Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, who promised the All-Army Officers' Assembly that he would eliminate the housing debt for servicemen, was of course guided by some sort of momentary considerations and by the consciousness of the entire weight of the problems of servicemen without apartments in the army and navy. The decree signed by him on 19 February unambiguously requires the Russian Federation Government, the governments of the republics that make up the federation, the organs of executive power of krais, oblasts, autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg to eliminate the housing allocation debt to servicemen in 1992, including share participation in the construction of housing. However, the document came to light nearly three months ago and the elimination of the housing debt has just barely begun, and not everywhere.

GlavKEU [Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate] representatives told a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent that, according to the situation as of May 1992,

they had begun to repay the housing debts only in certain krais and oblasts of Russia. If you take only those regions where the debt is the greatest, in Novosibirsk Oblast only 3,800 square meters has been eliminated with a debt for shared participation in construction of 22,200 thousand square meters of housing; in Omsk Oblast, only 2,400 of 10,800 square meters; in Saratov Oblast, only 6,400 of 21,800 square meters; and, in Sverdlovsk Oblast, only 2,100 of 11,500 square meters of housing... Meanwhile, these are precisely those oblasts where the administration is undertaking definite efforts for the repayment of the housing debts. Moscow, for example, with a shared participation housing construction debt of 11,100 square meters, has practically not yet begun to eliminate it, the same thing concerns housing which they should have allocated in accordance with the currently in force 1984 RSFSR Council of Ministers Decree 451-34 that has not been rescinded by anyone. And this is more than 230,000 square meters! In Krasnoyarsk Krai, (Head of Administration V. Dyakonov) with a debt of 10,100 square meters for shared participation, a dash is listed on the "received" chart like on the chart where the quantity of square meters allocated for servicemen who have been released into the reserve should be designated. Zeros on the charts for Irkutsk Oblast (Head of Administration Yu. Nozhikov), and paltry figures for Volgograd Oblast (Head of Administration I. Shabunin)...

Yes, we cannot rule out the fact that today, with the drastic increase in the cost of housing construction, the decline of production of those who work in the construction industry, the shortage of resources for housing programs in local budgets, the problem of repaying housing owed to the military is a heavy burden lying on the local authorities. The people in uniform know that and they understand it.

Meanwhile, documents and facts provide the grounds to suggest that the leaders of some executive organs for now are quite fearlessly seeking any opportunity to remove the burden of responsibility from themselves.

GlavKEU representatives showed us the report of a KEO [Billeting and Maintenance Department] chief of a division that is deployed on the territory of Leningrad Military District. He reports to the GlavKEU chief that the Saint Petersburg Committee for Economic Development is reducing the housing debt owed to the division by increasing the cost of one square meter of housing. During the recalculation of the housing debt in 1992 construction cost prices, the local authorities have reduced the figure of the housing debt for shared participation in construction from 1,011 square meters to... 116 square meters. In other words, having received at one time material resources and funds for the construction of more than 1,000 square meters of housing for servicemen of this division, the local authorities have not repaid the housing debt for many years and are now prepared to repay a total of 100 square meters...

On 4 March, Belgorod Oblast Head of Administration V. Berestovoy also communicated his readiness to thus "repay the housing debt" to the military in a letter to CIS Joint Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov. There are also other similar communiques.

All of this has resulted in the fact that the military department has understood: they should not count on the repayment of the housing debt "without additional payments". And on 21 April 1992, Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov was compelled to send a letter to First Vice Premier Ye. Gaydar. The letter stated that realization of the 19 February Russian Presidential Decree had practically not begun in places. For the 1st Quarter, 613 of the 20,500 apartments of the housing debt on shared construction had been received for government decrees that had previously been in force, 46 of the 52,700 apartments needed for the resettlement of individuals who have lost contact with the Armed Forces from closed and isolated military facilities, 378 of the 41,100 apartments needed for families of servicemen who have been released into the reserve or who have retired. The heads of administration, while referring to the reduction of the volume of housing construction using centralized appropriations from the republic budget, link the issue of repayment of the housing debt with the allocation of additional capital investments. And therefore the military department has been compelled to request a review of the possibility of partial financing of the construction of housing in the interests of servicemen from the republic budget...

The Committee for Social Security of Servicemen under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense has also arrived at that same thought. At a session which recently occurred with the participation of representatives of the Russian Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economics, Ministry of Construction, the military department, and other interested structures, a decision was made on the initiation of a search for additional sources of financing for the construction of housing for military personnel in order to report their thoughts to the government and to the President of Russia.

We think that this approach is justified. Moreover, it is necessary. But it is obviously just as necessary to once again strictly demand unconditional, without tricks, execution of the Presidential Decree from the leaders of local executive organs. Executive organs are executive organs so that they can implement the decisions made at the legislative level, and not revise or impede them.

Today, the creation of the Russian Army is occurring. The burdensome inheritance that has been left from previous times is weighing down this process. But if Russia needs a reliable army, if it does not want irreversible changes in the corps of regular military personnel, and their loss of self-respect, it must do everything so that President B. Yeltsin's Decree is carried out.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

WGF Commander Asks CIS States not to Abandon Troops

92UM1101A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Jun 92 First edition p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel A. Ladin, under the rubric: "From Alma-Ata": "The Commander-in-Chief Thanks and Sounds the Alarm"]

[Text] Western Group of Forces [WGF] Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General M. Burlakov's appeal has been sent to the central newspapers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and other CIS states. It contains warm words on the service of soldiers of 70 nationalities in the group of forces.

At the same time, Col-Gen M. Burlakov appeals to the leadership of the states, parliaments, clergy, and peoples to not leave the WGF, which during all these years has remained the forge of fighting skill and the school of the friendship of peoples, alone with great difficulties.

The appeal states that, at the present time, the number of tasks facing the troops has increased immeasurably. This is associated with the fulfillment of the treaty on the temporary presence and gradual withdrawal of the WGF from the territory of Germany. As a result of the release into the reserve of soldiers and sergeants who have served the prescribed time periods, the group has found itself in a difficult situation and the manning of some units and subunits does not exceed 50 percent. There are simply not enough workmen to load vehicles, weaponry, and material-technical resources, to recultivate lands and to clean up the facilities being abandoned.

On behalf of the WGF Military Council, the commander-in-chief requests understanding of the concern and alarm of those who are carrying on their shoulders the burden of responsibility for our troops in Germany and to utilize all possible steps to fulfill the conscription plan for young replacement troops so that the group's division-sized and smaller units return to the Homeland from abroad.

Personal Difficulties of CIS Servicemen in Baltics

92UM1057A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 May 92 First edition p 3

[Article by CIS Joint Armed Forces Officers' Assembly Coordinating Council Cochairman Captain 1st Rank A. Petrov and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Zyubin: "Instructions for Survival? Army and Naval Forces in the Baltic Countries That Have Been Taken Under Russian Jurisdiction"]

[Text] The word "to survive" has two meanings: to remain alive after an illness or misfortune; or, to be forced to leave your own home and to be compelled to

move away from somewhere. And unfortunately both of them are suitable to assess the situation in which officers and army and naval warrant officers who are serving in the Baltic countries have found themselves.

It is that impression that remained after a recent temporary duty assignment...

"You know, at times I feel like such a spider in amber. I have the most beautiful home in Tallinn, ancient architecture, well-maintained roads and parks, quaint cafes and movie theaters but, like that spider that got bogged down in pine resin thousands of years ago, I am not a beauty like the amber... You think about one thing: how to survive and to feed your family. You have to "hang around". And, I will frankly say that it is not always in legal orbits,"—frankly stated a Northwestern Group of Forces officer.

In order for the reader to understand this mood, let's cite several figures. The salary, say, of a captain-lieutenant who is serving in Tallinn is approximately 2,340 rubles (For comparison: an Estonian police private receives from R7,500 to R11,000). Now let's start to subtract. Rent for an apartment is approximately R857 (it will increase to R3,000 by the end of the year!!!). Subtract another R600 for a child in kindergarten. Sixty rubles for city transportation. That leaves R733. And now try to dress and feed yourself, your wife and child for this sum. In the process, consider that prices in some places in Tallinn are 1.5 times higher than Moscow's "biting" prices. The minimum subsistence level here as of March 1, 1992 (according to an independent trade union's data) is R2,500 per person. Incidentally, after the recent salary increase, a seaman receives R900-R1,000. And this, as you yourself understand, is only for cigarettes, cake, and the movies.

If an officer doesn't have his own apartment (and there are quite a few of them), then it is complete misfortune. Their situation is such that the word "to survive" will not seem to be hyperbole, it will become that in all of its harsh reality. Families frequently disintegrate because of this. Will many people venture to condemn the wives of officers, who have been ordered about to strange remote areas in semi-starvation, who leave to go live with their parents?

Some officers and warrant officers have been compelled to work on the side, as they say, on the second shift. Some have found jobs as bouncers at night video salons, others unload rail cars at the station until the wee hours of the morning, and some at times give way to dubious business. There are also those who, having grabbed an assault rifle at the unit, leave... no, not on the large road, thank God, matters have not been reduced to that—to guard prisoners at the local jail. And all of this for the sake of somehow augmenting the meager family budget.

We can also cite the "drastic" prices for everyday, transportation, and other services. Say, a formerly ordinary letter has right now become international and costs R20. On the contrary, we can talk about the lack of any

services whatsoever (you can neither send nor receive that same alimony). But no matter how many times we cite facts and figures, they do not provide a complete idea of the situation that has developed around army and navy units that are deployed here. Everything is much more difficult and furthermore deeply involved with high politics.

In this article, we did not set a task for ourselves to criticize or analyze the activities of the politicians. We see the goal in something else: to call society's attention to the situation in the Baltic countries for the "man with the rifle" and to once again call for the calm, civilized resolution of all disputed issues associated with the presence and withdrawal of troops at the interstate level.

And yet we will not refrain from one comment. While analyzing these countries' governmental and Supreme Soviet decisions and decrees, it is easy to note that they have taken a course toward creating unbearable conditions for the military. In our opinion, the instructions for survival (now already in the second meaning, in the sense of exclusion) of the army and navy from the territories of these states are hopeless. They can worsen the situation and reduce it to an explosively dangerous state, but they cannot resolve the problem. The Army will only withdraw according to orders. Otherwise, it ceases to be an army and is transformed into an armed band with all of the attendant consequences. The command authorities and the government will give the order for a change of the troop disposition and it, as we all know, is in Moscow. So, pressure on that platoon commander will only affect his family and children and will not at all impact the time for the transfer to a new duty location.

But unfortunately in all probability this pressure will increase with each passing month. Tallinn Naval Base Commander Vice-Admiral Yu. Belov shared his alarm:

"In the near future, they plan to introduce a visa entry system in Estonia and its own hard currency—the krona. And already right now they have determined this procedure for exchanging rubles for krona that they will make them inaccessible for us—the servicemen. Yes and right now we have enough problems. We have to pay the Estonians R46 per ton of water and R1.20 per kilowatt-hour of electricity... For May, we have received nearly nine percent of the required sum to pay officers' salaries. We have decided to give it all to personnel in service afloat. The staff will wait..."

And in what conditions of poverty have Armed Forces pensioners of the former USSR found themselves! They are simply unable to pay their rent: at times, it is larger than their pensions... The threat of eviction has hung over them. The residence passes of servicemen who have been released into the reserve or who have retired and of members of their families have been recognized as null and void if their permanent place of residence prior to military service was not in Estonia. Say, Captain 1st Rank A. Yezhov has lived in Tallinn for 33 years and

now, in the twilight of his life, he has become an alien. He has obtained a residence permit for one year. But then what?

No less alarming notes sounded in the voice of Captain 3rd Rank S. Volkov. (until recently he was an Estonian Supreme Soviet deputy but on March 11 he and another three servicemen-deputies were removed from the Estonian Supreme Soviet). Sergey Aleksandrovich stressed that the politicians with the most nationalistic sentiments are not concealing their joy with regard to the difficulties that are arising among the military after the introduction of the krona. Estonian Committee for Economic Reform Chairman Enn Roose stated, for example, that Russian servicemen will have to save their own skins and be fed using commercial deals after the introduction of the krona...

Recently the CIS Joint Armed Forces Officers' Assembly Coordinating Council has been receiving a multitude of appeals and statements from the Officers' Assembly of units and ships that are deployed in the Baltic countries. They contain all sorts of persistent appeals to do everything possible to facilitate the resolution of their problems. Harsh words and categorical demands are being increasingly heard in these documents. They concern not only social guarantees. For example, such as the demand for residence permits and payment of compensation which would equalize housing payments in the Baltic Region with existing payments in Russia where a 50 percent discount has been introduced, allocation of resources (and still better preparation of a state program) for construction of housing for officers who have been released and their families. One of the main demands is the most rapid determination of the legal status of servicemen on the territory of the sovereign Baltic states.

Officers V. Stolbkov and A. Sedov, who were on duty at the PVO [Air Defense] division command post, painfully said that they have been placed in a difficult position from the legal point of view. There is no precise answer to what would seem to be a simple question: Whose air borders are they protecting? If a violation of the airspace occurs, you think long and hard before you give the order for destruction. If you shoot it down—you will answer to an Estonian court, and they will say, what right did you have to use weapons on the territory of a sovereign state. If you don't shoot it down—you will answer to Russia: why did you let it fly through... What kind of high combat readiness can you talk about here?

Colonel V. Boyko from this same division complained: his pilots are losing their skills because they are not flying. There is no kerosene and there are difficulties with spare parts deliveries. If matters continue like this for much longer, the pilots will forget how to fly and the aircraft will only be suitable for the scrap heap.

During our meeting, Division Commander Major-General V. Tyutyunnikov reminded me first of all of the need for the most rapid adoption of the status. In his

opinion, the transfer of the troops to Russian jurisdiction is not eliminating all of the problems. This matter also caught our eye: a small tricolored Russian flag also stood on a small table cluttered with long range communications and ZAS [secure communications equipment] telephones. During our entire conversation, the general looked at it with hope. And this is understandable, he cannot expect help from anywhere other than Russia.

Only once did his eyes flash with pride: "I am astonished by the steadfastness and courage of our officers. Just where can you get such men! The workload has increased many-fold due to the shortage of personnel, they have had it up to here with everyday confusion, the local press is making a fuss, they say, we are occupiers, go home, and they do know how to do their thing. Today I was at the firing range. The majority of the marks were good and excellent... But the patience of the officers is, of course, not unlimited."

We also became convinced of that during a meeting with the officers of Tallinn Naval Base. The conversation turned out to be very harsh and emotional. Passionate voices rang out, they said, we must not forget Sablin. Or this opinion was expressed: once they call us occupiers, then we need to conduct ourselves appropriately and not sentimentalize. The majority (thanks to them for their long-suffering) are still waiting and still hoping.

And in conclusion one more example-warning. The submarine *Lembit* is at the Olympic Sailing Center in Tallinn. Until recently, a branch of the Baltic Fleet Museum was located in the *Lembit*. This submarine has a rich history. It was built prior to the war with the Estonian people's resources. In 1940, it was transferred to the Baltic Fleet. It fought from 1941 on. It has 21 sinkings of enemy ships and transports on its combat record. Russian and Estonian seamen fought shoulder to shoulder as members of the crew throughout the entire war. It is understandable that for the people of Estonia—this is also a precious relic.

The arguments began when demands were advanced about transferring the submarine. We do not know for what reason but they turned out to be unsuccessful. Mostly likely everything became bogged down in the bureaucratic routine. At that time, the Estonian side shifted to forceful methods to resolve the conflict situation. People, armed with assault rifles, seized it on one of those days. It is a good thing that the matter occurred without an exchange of fire and without victims. But what an aftertaste remained in people's souls after this and what an unkind wave swept over in the press! Captain 1st Rank V. Gay (many seamen are in agreement with him) assessed the situation as follows: "They needed to make a decision and not force us into becoming a laughingstock. If we needed to transfer it, then with music and flowers. Take it and treasure it, really our fathers fought together on it. If you are not going to transfer it—then also manifest firmness. There are those forces to rely on. I am afraid that the case with the submarine was a trial balloon. The seizure of military

facilities and equipment can already follow after it. The legal foundation has already been laid for such actions."

We would not like for these predictions to come true.

UKRAINE

Morozov Protests Dispatch of CIS Troops to Ukraine

92UM1087C Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
23 May 92 p 1

[News release from the Press Service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense: "Decisive Steps Will Be Taken"]

[Text] The Press Service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has been authorized to inform the public that Ukrainian Defense Minister Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov and Colonel-General Valeriy Gubenko, chairman of the State Committee for Safeguarding the Ukrainian State Border and commander of Ukrainian Border Troops, sent a telegram to Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the Unified Armed Forces, and Admiral Igor Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

The telegram stated in particular:

"Despite the fact that the Ukraine has adopted the laws 'On the Universal Military Obligation and Military Service' and 'On the Ukrainian State Border,' which established the procedure for manning large units and units located on its territory, for defending and safeguarding the entire length of the country's state border, and for observing the status quo until resolution of issues concerning the Black Sea Fleet, there is dependable information that the command of the Black Sea Fleet is manning the fleet with conscripts exclusively from other CIS states.

"Considering this circumstance, we feel it necessary to report that we will take the most decisive measures to ensure that our legislation is not violated and activities are not conducted on Ukrainian territory by other states.

"We recommend that stationing of military contingents of other states in the Ukraine be terminated until political resolution of the issue.

"We retain the right to oppose this unlawful action, which can lead to undesirable consequences."

The heads of the Ukrainian and Russian state delegations participating in negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet were informed of the telegram's content.

R-Adm Kozhin on Formation of Navy

92UM1087D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
23 May 92 p 1

[Interview with Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin, commander of the Ukrainian Navy, by Major Sergey Nagoryanskiy, correspondent: "I Get My Strength From the Righteousness of Our Cause"]

[Text] The political ninth wave is rolling over the Black Sea. And perhaps this political kind of element is more dangerous than a natural element. It is not difficult to persuade oneself of this by visiting, for example, Simferopol for just a day. And what is it like for people who live here permanently? What is it like for Black Sea seamen, pulled to pieces by the uncompromising positions of heel-dragging politicians? "No one would hardly envy you either," I began my talk with Rear Admiral B. Kozhin. "You just assumed the position of commander, and literally after a couple of days fulfillment of the decree of the Ukrainian president forming the country's naval forces was halted...."

[Kozhin] Yes, I had to begin work in my new position not with the appropriate ceremonies but with raising the commander's flag aboard a warship. You know, recently it was written in a certain newspaper that has hardly been sympathetic to me that this commander was commanding only himself, and that he is not doing anyone any good. Well, it's not my fault that circumstances evolved precisely in this way. But I have to stay above them. All the more so because I am an optimist, and it is hard to change my mind in something, including in the correctness of my chosen path. I sincerely believe in the future of the navy, and of our cause. This is what gives me strength.

[Nagoryanskiy] What do you see as the future? What fighting power should the Ukrainian Navy possess?

[Kozhin] I would avoid naming any quantitative indicators now. Anyway, they are determined not by me personally but by the policy of the state, and by its military doctrine. But speaking in general, the future of our navy will depend upon the scientific accomplishments that are embodied in ships of a high class, and in equipment and weapons. We are counting on concrete assistance from scientific institutions and collectives and design offices, and on close cooperation with shipbuilders of Nikolayev, Kiev, Kherson, Kerch and Sevastopol, and laborers in all of the Ukraine. With time, I would very much like to believe that modern warships will appear with proud names on their bows—Danilo Nechay, Ivan Gonta, Oleksa Dovbush, Bogdan Khmelnytskyi, Petro Doroshenko.

[Nagoryanskiy] But this will cost our country enormous sums of money.

[Kozhin] You know, everything costs a lot of money today. But there should be areas that are a priority, ones into which assets should be invested primarily. The navy

is one such area. My hope is that the Supreme Soviet will heed this when it forms the state budget.

[Nagoryanskiy] As long as we're talking about money, I have this question. The Ukraine allocated 6 billion rubles to the Crimea for economic stabilization in the current period. In parallel, the Ministry of Defense placed a certain sum at your disposal. Informed (?) local politicians cite a figure of 10-15 million. But how much was actually allocated?

[Kozhin] I will have to disappoint such "informed" specialists. A million and a half rubles were allocated to us. For current expenses, so to speak. They are being used to fund the work of the organizing group established under the navy's commander. Let me say a few things about this group in passing. Many rumors and even direct accusations are circulating in regard to it as well. It is being said that Kozhin formed a staff for himself, and that people have been appointed to positions in it. That is, this is a pretext for accusing us of violating the moratorium imposed by the second clause of the well known decree of the Ukrainian president forming the country's navy out of Black Sea Fleet forces stationed in Ukrainian territory. Let me announce officially that we have not deviated a step from the moratorium. I've remained the sole individual appointed to a position in the navy. I have no staff of any sort. The organizing group that is the subject of so many rumors is working generally on day-to-day affairs far afield from developing combat training plans, and the like.

[Nagoryanskiy] Please discuss that in a little more detail.

[Kozhin] First of all the organizing group is working with those who come to it with the desire to serve in the Ukrainian Navy. It sees people like this every day.

[Nagoryanskiy] I was just going through the checkpoint when I saw several people coming here for a meeting with you.

[Kozhin] Yes, those are people who would like to see themselves part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. We are keeping strict records on each person who comes to us. Many of them I interview personally. And each day, the flow increases. I can say that there are presently around 4,000 seamen in our ranks who have sworn allegiance to our people.

Although let me say that our adversaries cite a figure of several hundred. What else has a relationship to the work of the organizing group? It is putting the finishing touches on documents on military issues adopted by the Ukraine. Right now it is studying draft regulations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. We have a number of ideas on this account. In the very near future we will submit them to the Main Staff. Many proposals for the Navy Regulations were developed here. We believe that these regulations should account for the features of the navy as a Ukrainian Navy. We are also developing the symbols. We have already submitted our first sketches to the Ministry of Defense. In short, all the actions taken thus

far, both by myself and the organizing group, are not even close to violating the moratorium you mentioned in any way, or to destabilizing the situation.

[Nagoryanskiy] Boris Borisovich, aren't such actions being undertaken on the part of, well for example, the Black Sea Fleet?

[Kozhin] I would not want to assume the position of accuser. This, you see, is not in my nature. Nonetheless, let me say that the fleet command is having some degree of influence on seamen who have sworn allegiance to the Ukrainian people. Unfortunately, such instances are numerous. Here is just one example of the latter. In an appeal to the Ukrainian, Russian and Crimean parliaments and to the delegations participating in the interstate negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet, naval seamen of the brigade of offshore defense ships that had been under the command of Captain 2d Rank Shalyt prior to his removal by Admiral Kasatonov, made harsh demands as a sign of protest against the pressure being exerted on them. It included dismissal of a number of seamen from their positions, and slander, which they reported in their appeal. They were even prepared to begin a hunger strike—we are talking about somewhere around 55 persons. Need I comment on this fact? The people do not understand the politicians, who have still been unable to leave the negotiating table with signed agreements. It was announced long ago that there would be a meeting at the interstate level in Dagomys. But it keeps being postponed. In the meantime, as we understand, the knot of accumulating contradictions is much stronger than it appears to many. Such that things are getting extremely difficult for the politicians, and it is hardly worthwhile to urge them on, including through the mass media.

[Nagoryanskiy] Boris Borisovich, you spoke of your contacts with the Ministry of Defense. Can it be asserted that you are receiving support?

[Kozhin] Yes, and constantly at that. Acting chief of Main Staff Lieutenant General Zhivitsa and other generals and officers have visited us. We are grateful to them for their considerable assistance, including Major General Palamarchuk, the chief of the Mobilization and Manning Directorate and deputy chief of rear services Major General of Aviation Avdeyev. I would like to use NARODNAYA ARMIYA to also express my gratefulness to Ukrainian people's deputies and to representatives of the public who are giving us moral support in these complex times.

[Nagoryanskiy] My wish for you is that this extremely complex period ends sooner for you personally, and that a time of really serious work on the navy begins. And as far as the raising of the commander's flag is concerned, I have, if you would permit, a wish for myself: to be able to write the story on such a noteworthy event.

[Kozhin] You may consider that I have already invited you.

Kuznetsov to Continue "Active Life" in Politics or Army

92UM1078A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 May 92 p 5

[Interview with General Valeriy Yevgenyevich Kuznetsov by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent Boris Sverdlov: "Kuznetsov: In Civilian Life Without Benefits"]

[Text] "Former general and former commander of the army corps deployed in the Crimea handed me two memorial letters of appreciation.

"One of them, typed in gilt lettering and signed by Lieutenant-General V. Radetskiy, commander of the Odessa Military District, stated: 'Respected Valeriy Yevgenyevich, you have earned prestige and respect with your efficiency and great abilities and with your sensitivity and kindness toward people. For your great discipline and efficiency you are awarded a gold-plated watch....' The other was an even more flattering description from the district military council."

The date the letters were presented was simply mind-boggling: 5 May 1992. On that very day V. Radetskiy evicted V. Kuznetsov from his office.

"In March I was unexpectedly offered several positions," the general told me. "They included the position of first deputy [commander] of the Carpathian Military District and chief of staff of the Odessa Military District. I was summoned to the Ministry of Defense to face a certification commission. Before the session Colonel Lazorkin approached me and said: 'Listen, Valeriy Yevgenyevich, we need to strike at Sevastopol. The fleet will be ours.' 'Are you out of your mind?' I replied. When the commission was actually in session Colonel Muyava asked me: 'If it comes to war with Russia, will you fight?' 'Never,' I said with finality.

"I do not consider either of these questions to be casual ones. Just think what absurd subjects are included in the training for officers and generals today: 'The Naval Campaigns of the Zaporozhye People Are a Model of Ukrainian Military Art' and 'The Zaporozhye Army Is a Model of Ukrainian Military Organizational Development.' Why, there is not even a hint of either military or organizational development there. Then we have 'Ukrainian Participation in World War II.' Does it not seem that the army is being overly Ukrainianized? I told this to superiors to their faces. I do not care who likes it. I could not remain silent when they began removing weapons, fuel and ammunition from the Crimea."

[Sverdlov] Valeriy Yevgenyevich, you took an oath of loyalty to the peoples of Ukraine.

[Kuznetsov] Well, in the first place, fighting against one's homeland is extremely immoral to many thousands of the Ukraine's officers. Am I supposed to go against my own two sons just about to graduate from military schools, against the ancestral home where my mother

lives? In the second place, I took an oath of loyalty to the peoples of Ukraine. Not to Kravchuk or Defense Minister Morozov, and certainly not to the nationalists who are increasingly making themselves known of late. I am confident, however, that the people are 100% against any war with Russia, could not even dream of one. If only you knew the torment I went through before deciding to take the new oath. It was only for the sake of the corps officers. Every officer is totally dependent economically and socially upon Ukraine, after all. If he refuses to take the oath, he has only one place to go—to Russia. And who awaits him there? Things are not good for the military in Russia today. I am confident that had I refused to take the oath, most of the officers would have supported me. At the same time, some people would have taken the attitude that it is easier for a general. He has an apartment, a decent salary, and Russia is back there.

[Sverdlov] You are apparently the first general in all of Soviet history and in the history of the CIS, so to speak, to declare a hunger strike.

[Kuznetsov] Following the failed certification, I returned to the corps. I was summoned to Kiev again soon thereafter. Just before departure I suddenly fell ill and sent my deputy to the ministry. The plane had barely taken off, when an aircraft landed from Kiev with the new corps commander on board. The plan was simple: to effect a "palace coup" in my absence. The Defense Ministry's agent was at a loss when he saw me. "We just dropped in on you for a few hours for an inspection." A short time later he assembled the corps commanders and read the order from the Ministry of Defense removing me.

It all started there. The Crimean personnel learned what had happened. A half-hour later pickets had been set up and several deputies of the Crimean Supreme Council began guarding me, as it were. I did not leave my office for six days, despite the fact that V. Radetskiy and his top brass arrived to implement the Defense Ministry's order. I would have surrendered my authority unquestioningly and obeyed if they had not treated me so despicably. I announced a hunger strike in protest. Several officers and 16 soldiers in the guard also declared one by way of supporting me. In the meantime the corps officers' assembly did not consent to remove me.

[Sverdlov] And how long did you fast?

[Kuznetsov] After they demobilized me, I could see that there was no point in continuing the strike. I left the corps immediately. My records have been turned over to the Procurator-General of Ukraine. I do not know whether I will receive a pension.

[Sverdlov] I believe you were the youngest general in the armed forces of Ukraine. Your record includes 20 years of service, the military academy, Afghanistan. Now you are a civilian. Do you regret it?

[Kuznetsov] Naturally, I regret it. I have now been registered as a candidate for deputy of the Crimea's armed forces, however. I will therefore continue to be active.

[Sverdlov] And if Russia should decide to use your expertise?

[Kuznetsov] If required, I would not refuse to continue in the military.

Chief of Staff Zhivitsa on Draft Military Regulations

92UM1087A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
16 May 92 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-General Georgiy Zhivitsa, acting chief of the Main Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: "What the Regulations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Will Be Like"]

[Text] Establishment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the profound changes and processes occurring in society and the army have naturally required development of new general military regulations.

Draft general military regulations were prepared by the Main Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in compliance with instructions from the Ukrainian minister of defense. A number of statutes from previously published regulations from the times of Peter the Great to the present, the armed forces regulations of other states, and the more than 850 proposals coming from the forces were utilized in the course of this work.

The drafts of three regulations were prepared: the Interior Service Regulations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties, and the Drill Regulations. The Disciplinary Regulations were not drafted separately; instead, statutes pertaining to military discipline were included in a separate chapter in the Interior Service Regulations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces Interior Service Regulations define the general rights, duties and responsibility of military servicemen, which depend on whether or not they are carrying out official duties. The regulations state in this case that servicemen are representatives of the government when they are carrying out the duties of military service.

The following rights of servicemen were spelled out for the first time in the regulations: to freely express their thoughts, and when necessary, to submit proposals and petitions to higher organs; to freely move about within the limits of the garrison; to wear civilian clothing during off-duty hours, wedding rings, and religious symbols under the shirt, and to possess religious literature and icons; when undergoing treatment in medical institutions, to invite clergymen for confession and communion; to marry a foreign woman with the prior

permission of the unit command; to spend regular leave in any country. Servicemen who had been employed in agriculture prior to call-up into the army are granted the preferential right to utilize leave at a time convenient to them. Servicemen have the right to continue serving in the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the basis of a contract, and to lengthen, terminate or interrupt it as they see fit.

The regulations also foresee the right of servicemen to wear and possess personal weapons under certain conditions with the permission of the commander, and to determine the manner of their use.

As we know, the regulations had not formerly defined specifically what servicemen were forbidden to do; instead, this area was regulated by orders and instructions, which led to various violations, including of human rights.

The draft of the new regulations prohibits servicemen: from joining political parties and groups, and participating in strikes, rallies, marches and other acts of civil disobedience; from participating in games played for money and in other games of chance, and from participating in the collection of money; from bringing toxic, radioactive, explosive and flammable substances onto the territory of the unit and storing them there; from consuming alcoholic beverages and using narcotic and toxic substances and drugs; from disseminating and possessing pornographic postcards, journals and other literature aimed at undermining morale and military discipline; from possessing and utilizing photographic, television and radio equipment without the permission of the command as well as transmitting various materials for publication via the mass media; from providing information of a military nature and professional secrets to various firms, associations, companies and private individuals.

There was much debate during discussion of the issue of the manner in which servicemen address each other. A decision had to be made as to whether to retain the word "Comrade," or to introduce some other form of address. Most agreed on the word "Pan." It was thus determined by the regulations that in addressing each other, servicemen must add the word "Pan" before the rank. For example: "Pan Sergeant," "Pan Major" and so on. During off-duty hours servicemen may refer to each other by first name, and when addressing chiefs and seniors, by first name and patronymical.

The general duties of commanders (chiefs) are determined more fully in the regulations, but the duties of the chiefs of branches of troops, special troops and services are not reflected. Our idea here was that they should take as their guidelines the general duties of commanders (chiefs), and that their specific duties would be reflected in the corresponding regulations, manuals and handbooks pertaining to their services, written by Ukrainian deputy ministers of defense, by commanders of the

armed services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and by chiefs of directorates of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

The chapter "Military Discipline and Disciplinary Practice" offers a new interpretation of military discipline, and it describes its basis and how it is attained. This chapter determines the rights of commanders and chiefs in applying incentives and imposing disciplinary punishments, and in its content it differs significantly from the former Disciplinary Regulations.

The chapter describes the concept of incentives, and determines their forms: commendations, 24-hour passes, certificates, diplomas, badges, gifts or money prizes, and the chest badges "Excellent Specialist" and "Excellent Specialist of the Ukrainian Armed Forces." When awarded such a chest badge, servicemen receive extra monthly pay of 20 percent. The right to award the "Excellent Specialist" chest badge is granted to a brigade (regiment) commander, while the right to award the "Excellent Specialist of the Ukrainian Armed Forces" is reserved for the Ukrainian minister of defense.

The regulations define what a disciplinary punishment is, and establish the time and procedure of imposing and rescinding it. The following forms of disciplinary punishment are foreseen: reprimand, strict reprimand, forfeiture of a regular pass for up to one month, forfeiture of the chest badges "Excellent Specialist" and "Excellent Specialist of the Ukrainian Armed Forces," imposition of a monetary fine equal up to 20 percent of pay, and detention of servicemen for up to one day in a guard-room.

As we can see, arrest has been excluded from the list of disciplinary punishments. This was done because for practical purposes it does not play the appropriate educational role; moreover it diminishes the person's human worth and infringes upon human rights. A serviceman may be arrested only by court order, meaning that arrest is not within the competency of a commander (chief).

The mechanism for submitting and examining complaints was revised. It now obligates the commander to attentively analyze each complaint and reach specific decisions on complaints. In the event of an inconsistency between the submitted complaint and the decision adopted in relation to it, the commander is obligated to submit it for examination to a higher chief.

A section dealing with preserving the health of servicemen gives the unit physician the right to release servicemen from their official duties for up to three days. However, the physician is obligated to submit a list of released servicemen to the unit commander for approval.

A new chapter titled "Alert Duty" was introduced into the draft regulations. It governs the preparation of personnel for alert duty and determines the duties of officials of the alert shift.

For the first time an appendix to the draft regulations includes: the rights of servicemen and excerpts from the Ukrainian law "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Families," and the yearly holiday of the military unit; the procedure for distributing new replacements; the procedure for handling the departure of servicemen discharged into the reserves or retiring; the behavior of servicemen as prisoners of war, and the handling of prisoners of war.

The Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties regulates the duties of the principal garrison officials, and the organization and procedure of garrison and guard duty. The first part of the manual, "Garrison Duty," contains the duties of the principal garrison officials. The right to draw up the duties of other officials is granted to them; subsequent approval is required by the chief of the garrison depending on the features of the garrison's disposition. Because arrest is not foreseen as a punishment for servicemen, the position of guardhouse chief is excluded.

A separate chapter determines the procedures of service in a garrison by the officer of the day and his assistant, patrols, the subunit duty officer and the military motor vehicle inspection, and their duties and rights. Use of weapons by a patrol detail is spelled out in greater detail. This part of the manual also contains a chapter on all garrison measures in which troops participate. The actions of unit and subunit commanders (chiefs) in these measures are reflected in the Drill Regulations.

The second part of the manual includes all statutes regulating the organization and conduct of guard duty. Its content has not undergone significant changes, because it has been tested out by time, and it ensures dependable protection and defense of facilities. At the same time daily life has compelled us to go into the actions of the guard in response to an attack upon defended facilities, a natural disaster and fire more clearly in a separate section.

A technical security system operator and an assistant guard chief for guard dogs have been added to the composition of the guard detail. Not less than three hours are allocated to quality preparation of the guard detail for duty and to test its knowledge of its duties, and not less than three hours are allocated for rest.

During work on the Drill Regulations we felt it unsuitable to repeat statutes of the Field Manual concerning preparation of the individual serviceman for actions on the battlefield, in connection with which this chapter was totally excluded. All statutes of the Interior Service Regulations concerning the salute were reflected in corresponding chapters of the Drill Regulations.

The regulations were supplemented by a new chapter on actions of commanders (chiefs), troops and subunits during parades, and on saluting by honor guards. The content of attachments to the regulations was expanded. Answers could be found in them regarding inspection

procedures and evaluation of the drill training of servicemen, subunits and military units, setting up a drill pad, and forming a unit for complaints and petitions in a drill inspection.

These draft regulations were duplicated and sent to the troops for discussion. Considering the great interest of citizens in establishing the Ukrainian Armed Forces, especially on the part of reserve and retired servicemen, the draft general military regulations are published in the newspaper NARODNAYA ARMIYA. We expect to receive proposals and responses from readers, which will be examined attentively and accounted for when changes and additions are made.

Please send all proposals soon to: 252168, Kiev-168, Directorate of Armed Forces Training and Inspection, or to the editor of NARODNAYA ARMIYA.

Martirosyan on Role of Officers Union; Officer Housing

92UM1096E Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 19 May 92 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Nikifor Lisitsa, Carpathian Military District: "Having Rallied, We Will Solve all Problems",—Stated Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members Policy Committee Chairman Major-General Vilen Martirosyan During a Meeting with Carpathian Military District Staff and Administrative Officers"]

[Text] The meeting began immediately with answers to questions. And the officers had more than enough of them. And they did not pose them out of idle curiosity but they asked about what hurt. And military people have more than enough problems in the times in which we live. And it was no accident that the first question concerned housing. It was a quite burning question. While answering the question, Vilen Arutyunovich stressed that he began his work in Lvov with a meeting with the Ukrainian President's Representative in the Oblast Stepan Davymuka. The apartment issue was touched upon in the conversation with him. He learned that the oblast leadership is seeking all possibilities in order to allocate as much housing as possible to servicemen. Major-General Martirosyan also noted that the Ministry of Defense is allocating large appropriations for the construction of apartment buildings. But there are many difficulties with materials and there are other problems. Therefore, construction is being dragged out...

A question was posed on the role of the Ukrainian Union of Officers and the Officers' Assembly. In his response, Vilen Arutyunovich noted that the Officers' Assembly created in the Armed Forces of the former Union were not able to resolve issues in favor of officers since they were run by commanders—one-man commanders. Therefore, they did not work. Later they in general leveled. In this period, the Union of Ukrainian Officers also arose which has tasked itself with the goal of the organizational development of the Armed Forces of a

sovereign state and the social protection of servicemen. In Major-General Martirosyan's opinion, officers must be in it who do not pursue personal or careerist goals and who did not act for the sake of settling some sort of scores with their commanders but the most worthy, honest people and real patriots. And not patriots of Ukraine, but patriots of the people of Ukraine who defend the interests of all officers, regardless of nationality. And the Officers' Assembly must renew itself on a new, democratic basis.

Right now, Vilen Arutyunovich stressed that we need both the Union of Ukrainian Officers and officers' assemblies which are obliged to defend the legal rights and interests of officers.

Many questions were posed with regard to why some provisions of the Law on Social Protection are not in effect. For example, Article 14 states that disabled people and participants of combat operations should receive a 50 percent discount when using all forms of transportation. But none of the cashiers of Lvov, yes and of other cities, sell the preferential tickets upon presentation of the appropriate documents. And four months have passed since the Law was adopted.

While answering such questions, the committee chairman noted that, unfortunately, the operating mechanism of the laws that have been adopted has not been completely worked out.

Some questions, like, for example, with the allocation of plots of land for gardens for officers, were resolved locally by military district officials.

While concluding his speech, Major-General Martirosyan stressed that unity is needed as never before in the officer corps. Having just rallied, we will solve all problems.

Long-Range Nuclear Capable Aviation Elements Subordinated to Ukraine

92UM1096D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 19 May 92 p 1

[Article by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Press Service, under the rubric: "At the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense": "Long-Range Aviation—Part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces"]

[Text] In accordance with a Presidential Decree and a Ukrainian Ministry of Defense order, Long-Range division-sized and smaller units deployed on the territory of our state are subordinate to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. In the process, those units which have nuclear weapons in their inventory for the period until their elimination and their reformation will remain under the operational subordination of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Strategic Forces Commander.

In view of the position of opposition to the act of resubordination of Long-Range division-sized and

smaller units to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense that has been taken by some commanders and their unwillingness to serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, they have been withdrawn to the disposal of Long-Range Aviation Group Commander Major-General of Aviation M. Bashkirov. They are Division Commander Major-General of Aviation V. Grebennikov and Long-Range Regimental Commanders Colonels Yu. Kozhin and P. Androsov. Other officers have been temporarily authorized to fulfill their duties instead of them. Colonel V. Gorgol and Lieutenant Colonel V. Zhikharev have been restored to their previous posts.

The overwhelming majority of military aviators have perceived what has occurred with understanding and support and have taken the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine without hesitation.

Retraining For Withdrawn Western Group Personnel Organized

92UM1096B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 21 May 92 p 1

[Article by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Press Service, under the rubric: "At the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense": "Professional Retraining of Servicemen from the WGF"]

[Text] A specially created group on the issues of the professional retraining of Western Group of Forces [WGF] servicemen who have been withdrawn onto the territory of Ukraine and who have been released from the ranks of the Armed Forces has begun work at the Ministry of Defense.

Having collected and summarized information on servicemen and their family members, the Ukrainian military department working group, jointly with the similar structures of the Ukrainian Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Education are manning study groups on professions for retraining and are also organizing the assignment of WGF servicemen by military commissariats to study centers that have been reformed for retraining through oblasts (cities) employment services.

Troops not Threatened by Hunger

92UM1096A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 21 May 92 p 4

[Interview with Odessa Military District Food Services Chief Colonel Alfrid Zufarovich Asadullin by Odessa Military District Press Center Associate Lieutenant Colonel Valeriy Fedotov, under the rubric: "Interview with a Competent Man": "Hunger Does not Threaten Soldiers"]

[Text] I do not need to characterize in detail the food situation in Ukraine. It is sufficient to enter any store and everything will become clear. Under these conditions, many parents are worried: how do matters stand with food for soldiers? Aren't they experiencing food

shortages? I asked Odessa Military District Food Services Chief Colonel Alfrit Zufarovich Asadullin to talk about that.

[Fedotov] Alfrit Zufarovich, how do matters stand with supplying military district troops with food? Food has become expensive even if you can get it somewhere!

[Asadullin] We foresaw this situation and we created reserves beforehand throughout the entire territory of Odessa Military District. We prepared hundreds of tons of meat (incidentally, at the price of 7.50 rubles per kilogram), sugar, and groats. If we talk on the whole, then there are no problems with what is grown in Ukraine. There are problems with fish products and spices. In order to supply them, we need to access intergovernmental ties. We do not have that capability. Therefore, we are replacing fish twice a week with meat and eggs and milk three times per week in a soldier's ration.

[Fedotov] But how did you yourselves carry out the purchases! The food boom had already begun in the fall. And later, I know, the suppliers let you down. Specifically, with potatoes...

[Asadullin] Yes, a large shipment of potatoes that had been purchased in Gorkovskiy and Vladimir oblasts of Russia and the Petrikovskiy Rayon of Byelarus turned out to be contaminated with phytophthora. Our poor protection let us down: if military district representatives had their own mobile laboratories, we would not have had to purchase a pig in a poke. Indeed, the sellers ultimately admitted their guilt and returned the money. And we were compelled to purchase potatoes again in Chernygov and Khmel'nitskiy oblasts. We concluded direct contracts with kolkhozes and sovkhoses and sold them obsolete equipment: gasoline tank trucks, portable kitchens, and bread plants. In some places, we had to help them with sugar, groats, etc. At the present time, the military district is supplied with potatoes through 1 July.

[Fedotov] Prices for food products have increased sharply now. Is that having an impact on a soldier's ration?

[Asadullin] Regardless of price increases, a soldier is receiving everything necessary in full and, I stress, of high quality. By way of illustration, a soldier receives butter. As for meat, he is issued 175 grams per day plus 67 grams instead of fish. And now you tell me, can each person permit himself that kind of food ration at this current difficult time? Of course, prices have increased. If meat previously cost R7.50 per kilogram, it is now R180. The price of butter has increased from R3.60 to R180-200. Milk is R10-12 per liter. Eggs are R25 per dozen. The difference in prices is covered exclusively from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense fund. There are no subsidies whatsoever.

[Fedotov] There are a number of military sovkhoses in the military district. What is their contribution to supplying the troops?

[Asadullin] Our seven military sovkhoses supply the troops with meat for five months, fresh milk for eight months, and with eggs year round. They raise all vegetables, except potatoes.

[Fedotov] Alfrit Zufarovich, and still I know through experience: some young soldiers assert that they are experiencing a feeling of hunger for the first time.

[Asadullin] The standards for issuing foodstuffs are scientifically based. Furthermore, as far as I know, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense plans to review some of them. The dissatisfaction of some new recruits has been caused, not by the lack of foodstuffs, but by the change in the rhythm of a young man's life. He exerts more physical effort than previously and is homesick. But this state normally soon passes. Incidentally, additional food has been provided in the army. For example, for individuals who perform combat alert duty and during field exercises. It is provided through private plots and is not part of the general food ration.

[Fedotov] What is being done to increase the quality of food preparation?

[Asadullin] The quality primarily depends on the cook's skill. We specially train them. The course of the training process is constantly in the field of our vision. There was no training for future cooks in this six month period due to disruptions and interruptions for various secondary causes. Although, you will agree that it is difficult to train a real specialist in five months. In the civilian world, they study for 2-2.5 years.

[Fedotov] How are things with supplying dishes and other equipment?

[Asadullin] There have not yet been any disruptions. But they are possible. The fact is that meat cutters, potato peelers, and dishes are not produced on the territory of Ukraine. More correctly, they only manufacture porcelain and we need aluminum or semiporcelain.

[Fedotov] Many mothers are interested, is it worthwhile to send soldiers money and parcels?

[Asadullin] With regard to money—I am against that. That is grounds for conflicts and temptations in the subunit, being absent without leave and purchasing alcoholic beverages. As for parcels, I think that one parcel every two months will not interfere. In the food ration provided for soldiers, the only sweet item is sugar. And a soldier wants to eat candy and some home-made food. And then I know that many smoke. And cigarettes are now expensive, I have a son who is now studying at a higher military school. We send him a parcel once every two months. We want him to also have a small holiday. We want our soldiers to feel that someone is thinking about them. This spiritual tie means no less than a box of candy sent once in a while. As for parental visits with large amounts of home-made food, here I think we need to take steps. We should not make young

men blush who are just growing up and who have just begun to savor the strict, male life.

[Fedotov] Thank you for the interview.

Ministry of Defense Organizes More Language Training

92UM1096C Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
21 May 92 p 1

[Article by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Press Service, under the rubric: "At the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense": "The State Language in the Army Environment"]

[Text] The study of the Ukrainian language will be organized in Ukrainian Armed Forces units and subunits using study programs specially developed by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Socio-Psychological Directorate. The course of study is calculated for 96 and 48 hours—depending on the students' level of training. Studies will be conducted once or twice per week.

Officers Study Ukrainian

92UM1087B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
23 May 92 p 1

[Ukrinform news release: "To Your Desks, Officers!"]

[Text] A Ukrainian language study group began its work under the Chernigov Officers' Club. Around 80 percent of the garrison command sat down at the desks. The rest of the officers and warrant officers are fluent in the state language. "The first lessons are introductory," said Major Aleksandr Onishchenko, chief of the Officers' Club. "They are being conducted free of charge by instructors from an educational institute and a teacher advanced training institute, and by active members of the Prosvita Ukrainian Language Society. Actual training on the basis of an annual program will begin in September." Ukrainian language study groups are being established in all military units. Teachers from local secondary schools and officers' wives with an education background are being invited to teach.

Process of Building Ukrainian Armed Forces

92UM1058A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
23 May 92 First edition p 3

[Article by *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* Correspondent Colonel V. Kaushanskiy, under the rubric: "National Armies: A View From Within": "So Many Threads Tie Us... This Is Especially Visible From Kiev When the Question Is About the Organizational Development of Its Own Armed Forces"]

[Text] We remind our readers: under this rubric, we are publishing articles on the emerging armies of the CIS countries and the problems which they are encountering. We have already talked about what is occurring in the

armed forces of Byelarus and Moldova. Today—a discussion of the problems of Ukrainian soldiers.

We turned out to be traveling companions in a compartment of the Kiev-Moscow train. While becoming acquainted, the colonel briefly introduced himself: "Nikolay Vasilyevich Rizun, deputy chief of the Ukrainian National Guard personnel department." As usual on a trip, we talked.

He was being sent to Moscow on a quite difficult mission: to select Ukrainian graduates at military VUZ's [higher educational institutions] who desire to serve their own people at native hearths and homes. The colonel did not conceal that his mood was not totally optimistic. He did not doubt the success of his mission at the Academy imeni Frunze—he himself is a graduate of the Academy. But other VUZ's?

"You yourself understand," sighed my neighbor, "that mutual relations do not develop with ease. But people are needed. Both for the army and for the guard. We are building both the one and the other..."

It seems to me that today's concerns, with which Ukraine lives in the military sphere, were reflected in his worries as in a drop of water. It was the first of the former union republics to take an orientation toward its own armed forces and the first which encountered the problems that result from that.

And about yet another "championship". Ukraine has determined that, despite its membership in the CIS, it does not intend to become a part of the Commonwealth's military structures...

Quite enough has already been said about the legislative contours of Ukraine's military organizational development, including in *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*. And now we need to especially talk about some of its specific parameters. A significant reduction of troop formations is envisioned through military reform in Ukraine. According to the ministry leadership, approximately 230,000-250,000 servicemen will actually remain under arms from that armada which formed the Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian military districts.

"Of course, this is not a one-day process," noted Acting Armed Forces Chief of the Main Staff Lieutenant-General Georgiy Zhivitsa in a conversation with me. "The military districts will be transformed into two operational axes. We are specifically eliminating the army element in the ground troops, leaving the corps element. It is the same thing in aviation—here 2-3 aviation groups will be formed in the future. The PVO [Air Defense] structure will also undergo changes.

Have many been reduced as of today? The general gave me this number: nearly 50,000 for the first quarter of this year. And with regard to the fact that won't the reorganization strike along the precisely developed former

combat training system which now, as never before, is associated with the economy's amplitude fluctuation, he noted:

"In our view, combat training will not suffer. However, already today significant adjustments have been made during training. Say, for the purpose of saving money, priority has been assigned to individual training and subunit training. As for maintenance of pilot skills and performing alert duty—here everything has remained without restrictions."

The general's words were interrupted by a phone call. Having engaged in a conversation and having made some notes on a pad, he briefly noted: "They called from Sevastopol." The Navy is yet another structure of the Armed Forces. But I will not touch upon this delicate topic since today it has been transferred to the sphere of grand policy at the level of the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, experts and state delegations. As they say, tomorrow's a new day.

Something else is more important. No matter what kind of military structures we talked about in Kiev, the knot of many problems was tied on the most substantial organizational development factor—the human factor. Having proclaimed the idea of its own armed forces, to man it Ukraine has assigned priority to its own citizens in uniform who have been cast to the whims of military fate throughout the cities and villages of the former Union. According to Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate data, more than 150,000 personal files of Ukrainian officers are maintained at the Moscow GUK [Main Personnel Directorate]. As of today, nearly 20,000 of them have expressed the desire to return to their native land for performance of duty. Behind each one is a wife and children. The number of those desiring to return is increasing not by the day but by the hour. The personnel boom has caused an influx into Ukraine of those who are attempting to become its soldiers and to settle on native land. It is entirely understandable that officers from garrisons of the Far East, Transbaykal, Baltic states, and Transcaucasus have been among the first to plan to return to Ukraine. I did not manage to speak with any of competitors for places in the Ukrainian Army at the Ministry of Defense Accessions Office.

The situation is quite delicate. Supply has significantly exceeded demand. How can that be?

In the hope of obtaining an answer to this and other questions, I headed for the office of Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate Chief Major-General A. Ignatenko. I have known Aleksandr Stepanovich already since the Transcaucasus where he served until recently as 4th Army deputy commander for combat training. He is a courageous and strong-willed man who has known the bitter taste of fratricidal gunpowder in the region's "hot spots". I asked him pointblank: Is it worthwhile for a man to return to Ukraine who, it has not entirely been

excluded, could end up being reduced, at a time when good prospects for advancement in service await him in that same Russia?

Aleksandr Stepanovich was frank.

"We are only talking about those," he noted, "who have expressed that desire. Yes, today we are reducing and significantly reducing the armed forces. But at whose expense? At the expense of those who have already exceeded the maximum age for service, who have housing, whose professional skills do not meet our requirements, and who for various reasons have not taken the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. There are nearly 10,000 of the latter. But our need is also great. Especially in the element—of platoon, company and battalion commander. The selection criteria are well-known: Devotion to Ukraine, high level of professionalism, and age. Our groups have been sent to CIS military educational institutions, to the navy, and to the military districts. We need to have a data base. The work is labor-intensive but it is encountering understanding everywhere outside Ukraine. Nevertheless, we firmly intend to return our citizens from "hot spots" in accordance with the Presidential Decree and to help those who have experienced misfortune in the Baltic Region..."

I will interrupt the general's monologue for a time in order to wedge into his discussion the one problem which we talked about in Kiev at various levels and which is painfully associated with the personnel issue. And so, housing. According to the Ministry of Defense, as of January 1, 1992 the total number of regular servicemen and servicemen who had been released into the reserve without housing totaled nearly 80,000. Recall the 20,000 requests whose authors are attempting to return to their homeland with their families. But what about the servicemen who are expected from the East European countries? That is, the trend toward an increase of the number of homeless is being maintained.

While considering these factors, it is not surprising that I could not catch Ministry of Defense Capital Construction and Troop Billeting Chief Major-General Dmitriy Rudnovskiy at his office for several days in a row. On the day of our meeting, a "window" had formed at his office: Dmitriy Aleksandrovich had just returned from the procedure of laying the foundation for the next military housing garrison.

"To the credit of the military builders, they fulfilled the plan for the first quarter," said the general. "Forty eight apartment buildings and two dormitories, that is 2,356 apartments, have been delivered turn key. We understand that the need is much higher. We are conducting work along three directions in the state housing construction program for servicemen. We are building through our own efforts (from 13,000 to 15,000 apartments per year), we are taking advantage of the opportunities for

cost-sharing at the expense of oblispolkoms [oblast executive committees] (another approximately 4,500 apartments annually), and contracts with foreign firms. Say, builders from the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] have turned over 1,500 apartments to us in Krivoy Rog and we have received almost as many from them at Staro-Konstantinov. They have proposed a total of 17 such villages, however their final number will be determined after negotiations between Ukraine and Russia which is also participating in the contracting process with Western firms.

And well this is the very time to once again return to the conversation on personnel. I set forth to General Ignatenko the alarm of those KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers who in letters and telephone calls pose the question: isn't Ukraine building its own army according to ethnic origin?

"But this is already, excuse me, a lack of information," Aleksandr Stepanovich knits his eyebrows. "The principle of citizenship, and along with it of equal rights, is one for all. In our army, more than half are non-Ukrainians. And if you talk about the future, then I am deeply convinced: nothing will interfere with a professional Ukrainian serving on contract in any CIS country."

Actually, the cooperation that the general was speaking about has already begun. I have in mind the Agreement on the Principles for Supplying the Commonwealth Member-States Armed Forces With Weapons, Military Vehicles, and Other Material Resources, and other documents. Life itself is driving this process, but...

Just one example which Ministry of Defense Armament Headquarters Chief Major-General Leonid Utkin cited for me. Kharkov Plant imeni Malyshev which produces tanks is tied to 170 related enterprises in Russia. There are neither orders, raw materials, nor salaries for the workers. But this is only one enterprise, how many similar ones are there in both states? How here can you not begin to think about impending social cataclysms? It would seem that it is not yet too late, in the general's opinion, we need to more rapidly emerge on a contractual basis, mutual agreement, mutual calculations in the sphere of production, repair, and scientific research, as it is customary in civilized states.

By the way, there has been progress. Just like there are also stable common interests. But the orbit of this progress encompasses three spheres for now: tank, motor vehicle, and missile-artillery. Joint scientific research work on the PVO line has occurred. But aviation has not yet been lucky. According to Directorate Chief Colonel German Bublikov's data, the repair of military aircraft is only partially being satisfied by enterprises located on republic territory, but they have also been compelled to go on "leave": there is no financing, and deliveries and contracts with the related enterprises are being disrupted. In a word, this is an already familiar picture. But how is it with aircraft that we jointly developed and which remain unrepaired? Two plants in Ukraine are

giving a second life only to the MIG-25 fighter aircraft. Will we cut up aircraft for scrap? We have already gone through that. Is there a solution? During the transition period, all of the old ties must definitely work but already under market conditions and conversion that has been called upon to alleviate the vicissitudes of fate for the workers, scientists and designers.

It is about this that Ukrainian Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Rear Services Major-General Grigoriy Avdeyev talked to me, having exclaimed in a fit of anger: "Politics-politics, but we need to feed, clothe, and provide shoes to people."

The supply people have their own headache. Ukraine can clothe soldiers through the efforts of its own enterprises but not officers or generals: Russia once again provides the cloth. Avdeyev's telephones are red hot. Among his subscribers—Black Sea Fleet seamen: no diesel fuel, gasoline, or bed sheets. And still more questions: and what about passes to sanatoriums? Here is his obstacle. As of today, the issue of sanatorium-resort support has not been resolved by the two states.

In a word, there are enough problems. Yes and how can there not be? The process is proceeding in a very complicated and ambiguous manner. But the main thing is—once you have made that choice, once you have decided to create your own armies—conduct business in a civilized manner and in a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding. Without attempts to somehow outplay each other and without confrontations that do not result in an advantage for anyone. I was also thinking about that when I was preparing this article. Obviously, someone will say that I could have posed much sharper, much more "uncomfortable" questions to my interlocutors. Yes, I could have. But was that necessary? Maybe we have had enough of that very sharpness... Maybe it is time to begin to learn to understand and to hear each other and to search for points of intersection of interests?

BALTIC STATES

Customs Duty on Military Cargo, Personal Belongings

92UM1092A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jun 92 First edition p 3

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Gromak, under the rubric: "From the Northwestern Group of Forces": "You Want To Take Off in a Combat Aircraft—Pay 5,000. A Customs Duty Has Also Been Established on Personal Items Being Exported by Officers"]

[Text] Seventeen cases of delays of cargo destined for military units have been noted last week alone in Lithuania. Since 1 June, the use of airspace by any types of army aircraft has been prohibited in Lithuania and Latvia. In the event of an "urgent need", the military must obtain... a license and pay 5,000 rubles for each

aircraft sortie. Since 1 June, a customs duty has been introduced both on cargo arriving for military units from Russia and on vehicles and equipment being withdrawn. This rule also extends to the personal items of officers, warrant officers, and their families who are driving out of Latvia. A customs duty of from 15 to 100 percent of their commercial value is being introduced on all types of things. That is, an officer will, as they say, be left as naked as a jaybird in the event he has to depart under these conditions.

"These cases," says Northwestern Group of Forces Commander Colonel-General Valeriy Mironov, "are causing a very sharp reaction among servicemen of the Russian forces. Appeals are being increasingly heard to defend our dignity and honor by any means, right up to the use of weapons. If incidents have not occurred by now, then that is only thanks to the fact that we have managed to convince servicemen of the social danger of such actions."

INCIDENTALLY.

As our Correspondent Colonel M. Ziyeminsh transmitted, the second session of the Baltic Assembly continued for three days in the Lithuanian city of Palanga. As always, a great deal of attention in the session's work was devoted to the withdrawal of the troops of the former USSR from the territory of the Baltic states.

"The Baltic Assembly," the concluding document stresses, "requests that all parliaments, interparliamentary organizations, and the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] assist the Baltic states in fulfilling their demands on the immediate withdrawal of the Russian Federation Armed Forces". All of this is forcing us to think that the Baltic countries are persistently attempting to "internationalize" the troop withdrawal process from their territory.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Officer Taken Hostage Released

92UM1088A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 May 92 p 1

[Unattributed Article: "Colonel Gorskiy Has Been Released"]

[Text] The Russian Ministry of Defense Press Center has reported that Russian Officer Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Gorskiy, who had been seized as a hostage by Azeri guerrillas on May 26 near Kyurdamir, was released Wednesday evening. The release became possible due to the firm position taken by the military command authorities during negotiations with the guerrillas.

As an ITAR-TASS correspondent has learned from reliable sources, on May 27 the Azerbaijani Minister of Defense issued an order to disband and disarm all militarized formations that have not become part of the national army or law enforcement forces.

Correspondent's Report on War from Armenia

92UM1077A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 May 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Dokuchayev: "War in May: The Situation in Armenia"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] From the files of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: Only now is Armenia organizing a cadre army, which is not engaged in the fighting. However, all the self-defense subunits are under the control of the Ministry of Defense and may be considered part of the national army now in its formative stages. Minister of Defense Vazgen Sarkisyan, in his 7 May television speech, stated that "Armenia already has her own Army, which is located on the border with Azerbaijan. Every second man is now willing to fight for the republic and give his life for her."

The border with Azerbaijan is being guarded by forces of the border commandant's office [Pogrankomendatura] reinforced by self-defense detachments.

The highway goes from Yerevan in the direction of Dilizhan, Idzhevan, and then the Azerbaijani Kazakh, ending somewhere in Tbilisi. Along the road you can see snow-capped summits and beautiful valleys with grape vines. There was a time when this road—on the Druzhba Bridge spanning the Khrami River, at the convergence of the borders of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, the leaders of these three republics would gather for a meeting. Now there is nothing of the sort. We realize that this comes as no surprise to the reader. We are telling the story in this way to make another point. Located on the route, directly on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, not far from the village of Aygesvit, sits a large piece of sculpture known as "Mother Armenia." When Captain 2nd Rank Gennadiy Dianov, our photoreporter, approached the structure to take a picture, it was at that moment that we heard the sound of a burst of machinegun fire. Someone located on the Azerbaijani side must have thought that the Armenians were up to something.

It seems only yesterday that the border running between the former Union republics was transparent, so to speak. Want to take a ride to an Armenian village? Fine. Or to an Azerbaijani location? By all means. Now, however, the previously friendly line is not simply a border: It is in all actuality a front line, complete with mine fields. In the evening of our stay in the Idzhevan area a Niva travelling in this inaccessible zone was blown up by an antitank mine set by the Azerbaijani side. One person died, two were injured. Incidents such as that occur here all too often. The border strip is now being watched through the sights of small arms speaking the language of the local home guard. This is not a situation of vicious fighting every day, but one in which gunfire and skirmishes occur frequently. For example, during the night of 20 May when we were at the border, a gun duel

continued until 3 am near the village of Aygesvit, with reddish tracer lines decorating the velvety Caucasian sky not far from us.

"It is safer here at night. That is when they save up their artillery rounds so that they can fire with more accuracy in daylight," said Meruzhan Khodzhumyan, one of the fighters in the local self-defense detachment, taking refuge in the shelter. "And so we keep fighting like that."

The Azerbaijani side in this area holds superiority in combat equipment, hence the frequent shellings of nearby villages by tanks, artillery, and even the BM-21 Grad. As we were told in Idzhevan, the Armenian side attempts to return the fire by using whatever it has.

Who is it that is doing the fighting on the border? The Armenians and other people there refer to them in different ways: Fedainy (protectors of the people), members of self-defense detachments, and, finally, fighters. Regardless of what they may be called, they are largely local residents, people who live in the towns and villages. While at the border we met Samvel Manucharyan.

"What made me become a member of a self-defense detachment?" he asked, repeating the question we had put to him. "Every man should be willing to defend his motherland if necessary. But as to the details, well, let us take a ride, and I will show you our school."

Fifteen or 20 minutes later we arrived at a school building (called the School imeni Hero of the Great Patriotic War A. Vasidyan), which was located in the center of the village of Aygesvit, the birthplace of Samvel. The school had not seen any children for quite some time. It was closed on 22 April, when it took a direct hit by the first incoming artillery projectile.

"Take a look up there. You can see the gaping hole in the third floor, which used to be the classroom of my son Sergo. The projectile hit at 11 am," explained Samvel. "The kids were lucky. Someone had a premonition that trouble was on the way, so classes were called off that day. We started to evacuate the children early in the morning. Just think what would have happened had we waited another day or two."

Most men did the same thing Samvel Manucharyan did and joined the self-defense detachment. These detachments make up the groups of the border commandant's areas. They consist only of volunteers, who undergo a screening. No weapons are issued if that is not done. We saw people carrying automatic rifles, carbines, and shotguns.

The border commandant's forces in the Idzhevan area is headed by Major David Khachmanukyan. A graduate of a Soviet military school, he now has charge of border defense in that area. How did he wind up there? He previously served in the Alma Ata Higher Military Command School, his assignment being that of training

platoon leader. With the subsequent change in the situation, Khachmanukyan became a member of the Armenian Ministry of Defense. While in Yerevan, he was appointed Chief of Forces of the Border Commandantcy, in charge of the border service. The rapid deterioration in the border situation was associated with an immediate expansion of his authority. David Khachmanukyan became the area commandant; as such, the State Security Committee subunits, militia, and local battalions come under his subordination.

The efficient defense system makes up for shortcomings in the area of weapons. Major Khachmanukyan chose not to say much about the tactics employed by his forces, but it was our guess that he possesses the capability of repelling enemy attacks by deploying subunits in directions posing the greatest threats. The same may be said about his equipment. In this connection, the most formidable item of armor forces of the border commandant wields is a T-54 tank which they managed—using their words—to "wrench out of the hands" of the Azerbaijanis. It was being repaired by specialists during our visit and will soon be employed in the fighting. Availability of ammunition for the vehicle is a matter about which we knew nothing.

The forces of the border commandant are under the tight control of the Armenian Ministry of Defense. The fighters making up these komendaturas [detachments of the Border Commandant's Office] are shouldering an enormous load. This is a consequence of shortages of weapons, communications equipment, and other materiel on the one hand, and the occurrence of frequent skirmishes on the other.

(The following information is taken from official files. It covers events occurring in the Idzhevan and Taush areas.)

7 May. The Taush area is enjoying relative calm after three days of fierce fighting.

9 and 10 May. Shelled on these days were the Taush, Goris, and Kafan areas of Armenia, including the rayon centers. Human casualties and material damages have resulted.

12 May. Goris and Taush areas being shelled by 122-mm guns and BM-21 Grads. Much damage being caused; growing number of human casualties.

15 May. Electric power station in Idzhevan suffered a breakdown; entire Taush area without power. Repair work to restore station in progress under continued shelling.

Although the fighting is localized, people who have not felt the wrath of shelling also suffer.

"Just this last spring several dozen people were killed, and the rayon hospital became filled with the wounded," said Dzheba Ananyan, chairperson of the Idzhevan Rayispolkom. "I do not know what to say to people when they ask for protection to work the fields. What is there

I can do to help if there is constant shooting coming from the other side? Of 6,000 hectares of arable land, 4,000 hectares lie in the border area, so there is no work going on there. I suffer constant feelings of guilt over these people."

We found that we could speak more easily with people who had acquired information by word of mouth rather than those who are subjected to shelling. In a village located close to Idzhevan, we correspondents were approached by elderly men and elderly women who asked questions: Could we do something about their troubles? Was there any way we could bring about an end to the shooting? We answered that we would put an immediate end to it if we only could. At 15:00 on 20 May, when we were inspecting a school located in Aygesvit that had been shelled by tanks firing from concealed positions located in the neighboring state, another shot resounded. Our mental gears started to make a calculation: Which is the faster velocity—that of a projectile or of sound? This kind of reasoning is elementary for a military person, but the point here is that someone started to fire on short notice.

We mentioned above the elderly men and women for a reason. They suffer difficulties and bitterness the most. An artillery projectile exploding near their house means trouble for them. Many of them for the rest of their lives will never have any comfort; they no longer are physically able to restore their demolished abode. Sixty-eight year old peasant Lendrush Pogosyan kept repeating as he showed us his house: "Who will build this for me? This is gone forever." A projectile destroyed exactly half his house; a television set, refrigerator, and other items were nothing but ugly fragments. It was in 1961 that Lendrush and his wife Anichka started to build their house and acquire things.

Located not far from there was another house in which the woman who lived there, according to what people say, was hit the hardest. She had been wounded while on her way to a store to buy bread. While in treatment in a hospital, she learned that an artillery projectile had hit her home.

There are quite a few tragedies such as those recounted above. About 100 projectiles fell into the village on 12 and 13 May alone. The villagers said that at first the incoming projectiles flew over the village and into the forest, but later the artillerymen must have made fire adjustments, since they were able to hit the very center of the village.

Just as badly damaged were the villages of Vazashen, Kayan-Avan, Azatamut, Tsakhkhavan, and Berkaber. Human suffering is seen everywhere.

What is most frightening, however, is that people in Armenia are becoming accustomed to the war. The same thing seems to apply to the neighboring state. War is becoming a normal aspect of life, something to be accepted as intrinsic to the border strip. What this means is that the wheels of war will grind out more and more

victims. And it seems that no one is able to do anything about it. The bloodthirsty genie has been let out of the bottle.

Report from Azerbaijan

92UM1077B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 May 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel O. Vladykin: "Report from Azerbaijan"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] In every area of Azerbaijan adjacent to Armenia, self-defense subunits control border sectors extending approximately 150 km. In only some of the subunits does the number of small arms in the hands of the personnel of weapons of Soviet manufacture and sporting shotguns amount to as much as 50 percent. As a rule, a single battalion is equipped with one or two artillery systems.

* * *

According to information provided by Colonel of Medical Service Vagif Ibragimov, chief of the Central Military Hospital, Republic Ministry of Defense, from February to the beginning of May there were 476 admissions of persons wounded while fighting Armenian military formations. That figure nearly doubled in the first 20 days of May alone. The number of persons killed is not known.

There, in the resuscitation room of the Central Military Hospital in Baku, dying before our very eyes, was Islam Agayev, a fighter in the National Army of Azerbaijan. He was dying, but he was fully conscious and in complete possession of his mental faculty. For us, looking into the eyes of someone who knew he was doomed was unbearable. With his eyes full of pain, he looked around at the people standing there in their white coats, as if to exact from one of them some hope of salvation, of help. His wandering gaze suddenly came to a stop on one of us; he literally fastened his eyes on the camera hanging on the person's white coat. With a hand devoid of any strength, Islam beckoned to be approached, his lips starting to tremble.

"He has guessed that you are journalists and wants to tell you something," explained Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Service Dzhamshid Yusibov, hospital head surgeon. "You may go closer to him."

Islam, making an incredible effort, while overcoming the pain racking his combat-maimed body, said the following:

"We ... are ... being ... accused... of ... everything. Cruelty ... violence... Not true! ... We...are...defending...our... land."

We could not make out what he said after that. Nurses bent over the wounded fighter, and we were asked to

leave the room. The last words Agayev said—"We are defending our land."—stayed with me for a long time after that.

The above words more than likely are the same ones said by Armenians as they reach for their weapons. They undoubtedly believe they have a just cause in their struggle. However, there we were, on Azerbaijani soil. When we were flying in a helicopter over lands adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian border, we could not help thinking about how those velvety green fields of May, looking with their rows of vineyards as if they had been drawn by a gigantic straightedge, had been worked by the hands of generation after generation of Azerbaijani peasants. For those people, the land was always something desirable and revered. It would never occur to them that they would ever abandon it. But now—alas!—some of them are forced to do just that.

We arrived at the rayon center of Kubatly the day after Lachin, the administrative center of the neighboring area, had been taken by Armenian military formations. It was then that the news media told the whole world that a "humanitarian" corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh had been created. Quite a development: It did indeed become quite easier to carry food supplies and medicines by land rather than by air in that previously isolated region. This became immediately apparent to the long-suffering residents of Karabakh. But hold on: What to do now about the populace of Lachin and villages surrounding it? It seemed they would be forced to abandon their homes and possessions and seek refuge in the more inner areas of Azerbaijan.

Incidentally, quite a few residents of villages lying close to the Armenian border, unwilling to sit and await the arrival of their armed neighbors, are already leaving the lands of their ancestors. Another cause of their leaving is the constant artillery shelling. The Kubatly area resounded with artillery fire during our entire stay there. Both night and day. We could often see clouds of gunsmoke on the crests of the mountains shielding the rayon center from the Armenian border. It appeared that the firing was largely by 122-mm guns, less often by the BM-21 Grad and Alazan rockets.

It is true that not many projectiles hit the town proper. However, in villages located on the opposite side of the slope, the damage was considerable. The artillerymen were using aimed delivery in the case of buildings located in the populated places of Novlu, Ashagy, Cherdakhly, Dzhibikli, Charali, Ferdzhan, Yukhary Dzhibikli, and Aliguliushagy, firing from a distance of 2 to 3 km. Direct hits reduced some buildings to mere foundations.

Strange as it may seem, the local residents do not consider the shelling to be their worst fear. The people have learned how to seek shelter and suffer less loss of life. They are much more afraid of raids coming from the adjacent fighter territory. And of sniper fire coming from concealed positions. There virtually is no way to find

safety from that. The Azerbaijani peasants maintain that the only way to combat that is by means of armed resistance.

The sound of sniper fire or burst of an automatic rifle heard anywhere there is sufficient to alert the self-defense guard posts of the Kubatly area to full combat readiness. As a matter of fact, they are the embryo of an Azerbaijani army, the potential capabilities of which are an item of great interest. Stationed there presently is a rifle battalion, which is commanded by Reserve Senior Lieutenant Adil Gashimov, who after graduating from an institute 10 years ago became a "two-year man" in the UNR [expansion unknown]. The battalion is equipped with modern small arms, with a third of the battalion—at the most—actually shouldering one of these weapons. There is a T-54 tank, which did not appear to be supplied with any ammunition; and a BMP-2, presently employed merely as a means of transportation. There were two armored personnel carriers sitting there without engines and their tires flat. It is possible that the subunit possesses something else, but that is all we saw.

All in all, the battalion, with the weapons and equipment presently at its disposal, can do nothing more than operate its widely-spaced guard posts to protect the border of the area contiguous with Armenia and the Azerbaijani territory taken by Armenian military formations.

The battalion commander set us up with a trip to one of the posts during a lull in the skirmishes and shelling. Noteworthy here is the fact that—from the military standpoint—it is situated extremely judiciously: on a commanding height.

Posts of that kind took up combat activity a number of times during our visit. The echo of firing resounded throughout the mountains, and, in the office of the chief of the National Security Department, the telephones kept ringing: "This is Charali calling. What are we to do; we are under fire." Or Battalion Commander Gashimov would be asked: "Request permission to fire. Dzhibikli again under attack." This kind of communication certainly cannot be considered favorable to the Azerbaijani self-defense forces, as far as military advantages are concerned. The point here is that, in this strange war, which is being carried out counter to many international rules, the establishment of any ethical rules of armed conflict would generate a faint hope for a civilized resolution of the prolonged misunderstanding between two one-time friendly peoples. This is the kind of end to the many years of confrontation that is desired by many persons—without malice or ulterior motive—with whom we spoke during our stay in the Kubatly area.

In the nearby Zangelan area, which is located where the Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Iranian borders come together, the same thing was said by Ildrym Mamedov, the temporary area commandant. "We must do all we can to stop the shooting and sit down at a table to find some solution to all the sources of trouble," stated the

officer. That is what drives him to make contact with the militia chief and military leadership of the neighboring Kafan area of Armenia. The contacts for the present are limited to the telephone.

It is a bitter fact that reason and a willingness to negotiate seldom prevail over hate and pride at the Armenian-Azerbaijani trouble line. That is why a civilized way out of this bloody conflict is still such an illusory dream. Worse than that, it seems that at times the prospects for this become even more remote.

A few days ago, the press made the shocking statement that Armenian formations in the Nargorno-Karabakh fighting have used chemical weapons. We set out to try to verify this allegation.

One of the physicians at the hospital we discussed above is a surgeon who had extracted a capsule containing a toxic chemical agent from a soldier who had been badly wounded in Shusha. Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Service Nikolay Nikitin, who is chief of the Anesthesiology and Resuscitation Department, gave us a detailed explanation of how he had suddenly felt personally the effects of the chemical agent. The doctor, while examining a capsule he removed from the wounded soldier—a capsule which apparently came from a chemical projectile that had exploded—accidentally tore one of the surgical gloves he was wearing. He immediately suffered a burning sensation on a finger, then numbness of the skin tissue. The place of contact with the chemical agent produced a burn. The wounded man, Favil Dzhafarov, miraculously saved by the medics, told us the following. After being struck down while fighting, he shortly thereafter started to lose feeling in and about his wounded shoulder, then throughout the left part of his body.

Rumors about use of toxic chemical agents by Armenian fighters had been circulating for some time. But what the doctors had was the first instance of proof of use of this barbaric weapon in the Karabakh conflict. Chemical analysis indicated that the capsule contained a cyanide compound. This being the case, what other hellish things are being planned by people who do not want to see the arrival of peace in the Caucasus or the restoration of neighborly relations between Azerbaijanis and Armenians? Of what else are they capable?

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Turkmen Defense Minister on Aims, Tasks of Ministry

92UM1024A Ashkhabad FRUNZEVETS in Russian
16 Apr 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Turkmenistan First Deputy Minister for Defense Affairs Major-General Bekdzhan Khakimovich Niyazov by Captain I. Biryukov: "Major-General B. Niyazov, under the rubric: "Face to Face With the Reader": "Republic Armies Need To Be Created in a Civilized Manner"]

[Text] History has been ordered in such a way that today the presence in their state structures of ministries, committees or other bodies for defense affairs is one of the signs of real sovereignty and independence of the former Soviet republics. Turkmenistan has also not become an exception. In January 1992, the Ministry for Defense Affairs was established by an ukase of President S. Niyazov. As we have already reported, Danatar Kopekov, who previously worked as Turkmen SSR Committee for State Security chairman, was appointed the republic's first military minister.

Turkmenistan First Deputy Minister for Defense Affairs Major-General Bekdzhan Khakimovich Niyazov discusses the reasons for the creation of the new ministry and the goals and tasks facing it in an interview with our correspondent.

OUR INFORMATION. Major-General B. Niyazov was born in 1947 in Krasnovodsk. He is Turkmen. A lawyer by education—he graduated from Turkmen State University. He worked as a people's judge in the cities of Krasnovodsk and Cheleken. From 1976 through 1982, he was a member of the republic Supreme Court and then in Party work. In 1990, he was appointed deputy minister of justice. Since 1991, he has been chairman of the Council for Coordination of the Activities of Law Enforcement Organs under the President of Turkmenistan.

On January 27, 1992, he was appointed first deputy minister for defense affairs by a Turkmenistan Presidential ukase. The military rank of major-general was conferred upon him.

He is married. He has three children. His daughter is a second year student at Ashkhabad Medical Institute. His oldest son is in the 10th grade of middle school and his youngest son is six years old.

[Biryukov] As you know, the impending creation of a military department in the republic was announced for the first time during the meeting between President S. Niyazov and CIS Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov which occurred in January 1992. Prior to that meeting, no steps whatsoever had been undertaken in that direction and therefore the ukase on the creation of the ministry was somewhat unexpected. What are the real reasons for the creation of the ministry for defense affairs and what tasks has it been called on to carry out?

[Niyazov] First of all, I would like to direct your attention to a quite important detail—Turkmenistan was one of the last of the republics of the former Union to create a ministry for defense affairs. Moreover, if I can speak frankly, this was a forced step. The well-known positions of Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova literally prompted us to do this. No one disputes the legal right of any sovereign state to have its own army. But it needs to be created in a civilized manner, while considering the interests of all parties, and not coerced without prior permission. While proceeding from the situation that has

developed, I stress that the republic government was compelled to resort to the creation of our ministry. Yes and how could it do otherwise? Really right now when the Armed Forces are literally being divided according to ethnic apartments, we, as you understand, could not be left in the role of a non-participating observer. The primary mission of the Ministry for Defense Affairs is the conduct of an independent military policy of independent Turkmenistan within the CIS. A search for balanced ways to restructure it while considering the opinion of all interested parties.

As for the missions which we face, I will single out several of the most important ones. First of all—coordination of the activities of division-sized and smaller military units that are deployed on republic territory and of the local authorities who must know about everything with which the military is involved, be it tactical training or some sort of troop movements. Henceforth, before conducting these kinds of activities, they must coordinate them with us. This practice is entirely legal and substantiated. Yes, and what kind of masters would we be if we did not know what is occurring in our own home and what is in it? I have in mind the qualitative and quantitative composition of the troops that are located in the republic. We hope that the military command authorities will be sincere with us on this issue.

We intend to transform the structures of the republic military commissariat and the former DOSAAF into directorates with direct subordination to our ministry to conduct effective work with conscripts and to train them for impending service (medical and professional selection and consideration of the social situation) and republic civil defense will also be transformed into a directorate.

I have not touched upon the subject of conscripts in this conversation by chance and this is why: The government of Turkmenistan advocates the extra-territorial principle of Armed Forces manning but this must occur with our direct participation and, naturally, with consideration of our interests. This task is one of the Ministry for Defense Affairs's primary tasks. To do this, we have established direct contact with the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command and General Staff. Taking advantage of the opportunity, I will say: young men who have been drafted from Turkmenistan will perform their service in the CIS Strategic Forces besides on the territory of the republic.

As for construction units, here our position is unambiguous—we will not send our young men to construction battalions because we consider the situation in them to be clearly abnormal. Not too long ago a republic Supreme Soviet delegation visited construction units located in the Moscow suburbs and the impression from the trip, honestly speaking, was unattractive. Essentially, people have been left to their own devices, commanders had practically no control over them, and the arbitrary rule of barracks hooligans reigns in subunits. There were

many sick soldiers and there was even a case when they discovered a soldier with an obvious physical deficiency. As they say, we had no other place to turn. Such phenomena are the direct consequence of the defect in the work of conscription commissions. And we do not intend to reconcile ourselves to that. Just like we do not intend to reconcile ourselves with a decline in military discipline in some military units that are already located on the territory of Turkmenistan. The ministry will take the most active participation in maintaining order and combat readiness in the troops.

[Biryukov] Doesn't it seem to you that dual authority can arise in units and therefore command and control organs will be disrupted with the establishment of strict control over the activities of the military? The events that are already occurring in Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan are more than convincing evidence of that.

[Niyazov] First of all, we do not intend to establish petty tutelage over the activities of the military and all the more so to protest some activities or other on an hourly basis. Besides, of course, those cases if they will clearly enter into contradictions with local law or can inflict any sort of damage to the republic. The emergence of dual authority or a muddle have been excluded if only because we conducted a series of consultations with the CIS Joint Armed Forces General Staff, Turkestan Military District command authorities, and with division-sized and smaller units deployed in Turkmenistan during which the positions and competence of the parties were precisely defined while we were still at the stage of developing the Ministry's goals and missions. So, those fears are in vain. Although it has not been excluded that situations can arise directly in the process of joint work that require immediate modifications to some plans or other.

[Biryukov] You participated as a member of the Turkmenistan delegation during the meeting of the Commonwealth heads of state in Minsk. We know that its results caused an unambiguous reaction both within the CIS and outside its borders. The reason for that was the sharp disagreements on the main issue—the fate of the Armed Forces. Have there been any changes in Turkmenistan's position in this regard?

[Niyazov] I think that it is hardly worthwhile to excessively dramatize the situation but then again we must also not underestimate it. But the essence is not that but the fact that even if we do not manage to reach agreements on a whole series of problems—both economic and military—this does not at all signify that insurmountable disagreements exist among the Commonwealth states. With the attainment of independence by the republics of the former Union, interests emerge in each of them that quite naturally do not always coincide with those of the other former republics. Those are today's realities and we need to take them into account. Moreover, I am personally confident that subsequent meetings will also be far from simple.

The main result of the last meeting is: the issue on the single command authority for the CIS Joint Armed Forces and its structures was resolved positively. The latter are being maintained during the transition period. It is hard to say how long it will last. Time will make its modifications.

As for Turkmenistan's position, it is based first of all on the fact that no CIS state by itself is capable of totally providing for its own security at this stage. As historical experience attests, even a state that has significant military might is not insured from the threat of external invasion. That is the main thing from which we proceed in our position. And it is invariable. Turkmenistan advocates a single command authority over the CIS Joint Armed Forces in that form in which it now exists. And if we do not succeed in preserving it as an integral organism, we will search for other ways to provide for the security of our republic.

[Biryukov] Lately, quite a lot has been said about the possible conclusion of a military alliance with Russia. How substantiated are these thoughts and what has caused them?

[Niyazov] We are not excluding that possibility for several reasons. First of all, if I may speak frankly, for our part it would not be entirely rational to rely only on our own forces to attempt to ensure Turkmenistan's security. And I will permit myself to repeat—if we do not succeed in preserving the unified Armed Forces, we will strive for such an alliance. The Russian Federation leadership also recognizes the need for that.

Secondly, mutual interests exist both for Russia in Turkmenistan and for Turkmenistan in Russia. Too much ties us together in order to throw it all away and for each of us to remain alone with our problems. The future alliance is open to everyone. It is therefore quite possible that the other Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan could accede to it, naturally, under conditions that suit all interested parties.

Already right now we are finding mutual understanding on many issues in Russia, say, in training officers. We did not face this problem until quite recently but today Ukraine and Azerbaijan are demanding payment for training. Training one man at the internal troops school located on the territory of Azerbaijan will be quite expensive—as much as over 400,000 rubles per year. You yourself understand: we cannot afford such expenditures right now. Therefore an agreement has been reached to train our young men at Russian military schools free of charge.

[Biryukov] It is no secret that a quite large military formation that has substantial reserves of physical assets is deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan. And quite recently we all became witnesses to Uzbekistan's acceptance under its jurisdiction of division-sized and smaller units that are located on its territory. Does the republic government have such plans and does it intend to nationalize existing arms and equipment?

[Niyazov] The republic government has no such plans as of today. At least for right now, in the future everything will depend on how the situation develops.

As for the troops that are in the republic, their strength was determined by a whole series of historical and political causes and Turkmenistan's geographic location. The troops deployed in the republic also provide security for the entire Commonwealth.

[Biryukov] As you know, supplying the troops is carried out centrally, through the military district command and control organs. Today, as a result of legislative acts that have been adopted by a number of republics that prohibit the withdrawal of military equipment and supplies outside their territory, certain difficulties arise with supplying military units with everything necessary. How does the republic government intend to resolve them?

[Niyazov] Turkmenistan will fulfill all of its obligations for supplying the troops with food, POL [Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants] and everything else. President S. Niyazov has repeatedly stated that. In all other cases, we will resolve problems that arise through negotiations with neighboring republics in close cooperation with the military command authorities. In the future, we intend to structure supply in such a way that would exclude the presence of any intermediate structures, in this case—military district structures.

[Biryukov] And nevertheless during the January meeting with Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, President S. Niyazov in his turn also announced a ban on the withdrawal of military equipment outside the borders of the republic. What does this mean in practice?

[Niyazov] First of all, control over those things that are being withdrawn and for what purpose. The republic government should not remain ignorant with regard to military transport movements. We understand—a categorical prohibition on the withdrawal of military equipment outside the borders of the republic, by way of illustration, tanks or BMP's [armored personnel vehicles] that require repair, can engender great difficulties, really there are no enterprises of this profile in Turkmenistan. Or if the matter concerns, say, replacing obsolete models... Both in the first case and in the second, we will not create any impediments.

I think that our position on this issue is clear to everyone and will be met with understanding.

[Biryukov] The majority of officers and warrant officers who are performing service on the territory of Turkmenistan are Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelarusians. At the same time, the majority of compulsory service soldiers and sergeants are representatives of the republic's native nationalities. As a result of this, certain difficulties have recently emerged in the training and education of soldiers and, we might as well admit, in the preservation of military equipment. Yes and the very mutual relations between commanders and subordinates have not always been distinguished by their friendliness. Obviously,

while sensing the support of the "native walls," some Turkmen soldiers are ignoring the orders of their commanders. In some places, even threats of physical reprisals have been heard toward officers in response to demands to comply with the observance of regulations and, as a consequence, a high-strung atmosphere is developing in some military collectives.

[Niyazov] Officers and warrant officers who are performing duty on the territory of our state are fulfilling their military duty in the interests of the entire Commonwealth. That is the first thing that I must say while answering your question. Therefore, the government of Turkmenistan, as a full-fledged member of the CIS, is doing everything necessary so that servicemen and their family members do not feel oppressed in any way. Already right now effective steps have been taken for their social and legal protection. Dual citizenship for cadre military personnel is envisioned by our laws. I will not be mistaken if I say that the critical housing problem that exists everywhere is being resolved somewhat more successfully in our republic than in other regions of the former Union. Remote garrisons are being supplied with food in accordance with the standards that have been prescribed in our republic in addition to the generally accepted supply. In a word, everything necessary is being done so that officers and warrant officers, regardless of their ethnic background, can qualitatively and totally fulfill their official duties. Any manifestation of nationalism in military collectives or conflicts on those grounds will be assessed as a very serious crime. President S. Niyazov has repeatedly and unequivocally stated that at meetings with military personnel.

As for the demographic situation that has developed in units and subunits, I think that it will not be the most intelligent thing to do if we look for the guilty parties or someone's machinations. Rather, this is the direct reflection of the migratory processes that are occurring right now in the Commonwealth countries. We should not fear that, we need to learn to work under new conditions and adapt to them and not count on a "kind uncle" who will come and teach the soldier. Those times have passed.

On our part, we are enlisting republic Supreme Soviet deputies, elders, and veterans of war and labor in the work to consolidate military discipline, that is, we are not casting aside those forms and methods of educational work that proved their viability during many years of practice. In so doing, we do not intend to disregard, as this often occurred, criminally punishable crimes: including those associated with the theft of military equipment.

We regard with understanding the problems of servicemen—their uncertainty in tomorrow, the confusion in their everyday lives, and low monetary salaries. But you will agree that this is not the basis for a callous attitude toward service. Unfortunately, there have been such cases among officers. Undisguised aloofness from the performance of their duties is frequently encountered.

But the meaning of officer service consists of this—not to succumb to strokes of bad luck, but to perform your military duty with honor and dignity. Believe me, and I say this not for the sake of eloquence. Officers in all times have been the model of fortitude, courage, and loyalty to the oath. And it is nonsense to be afraid of any threats. But if just one of these threats is carried out, the strictest response measures will be taken on our part with regard to hooligans.

Language Becomes Issue for Kazakh Military Paper

92UM1093A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jun 92 First edition p 3

[Article by Colonel A. Ladin, under the rubric: "From Alma-Ata": "When They Speak in Two Equal Languages, There Is a Hope That We Will Better Understand Each Other"]

[Text] On 1 June, consideration of the draft new Republic Constitution began at the morning sitting of the 8th session of the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet. Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev delivered a report on this issue.

At the beginning of the discussion, Civic Harmony [Grazhdanskoye soglasiye] group deputies proposed strengthening the state status in it of not only the Kazakh but also of the Russian language. They were motivated by the fact that as of today nearly half of the republic's population has still not mastered the Kazakh language when the majority of the population of multiethnic Kazakhstan know Russian. According to the deputies, there could well be two state languages in Kazakhstan, as in many countries of the world.

Constitutional Commission Chairman Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed submitting the article on state languages for nationwide discussion.

INCIDENTALLY.

As we learned from unofficial sources, the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense is working out the issue of creating its own print organ. They propose naming the newspaper KAZAKHSTAN SORBOZY—SOLDAT KAZAKHSTANA [Kazakhstan Soldier]. It will be published in the Kazakh and Russian languages in a single issue. They propose publishing the first issue already in August 1992.

OTHER STATES, REPUBLICS

Claims of South Ossetian Nuclear Weapons Refuted

92UM1095A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 30 May 92 p 1

[Unattributed Article with commentary by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Correspondent S. Sokolov and A. Khokhlov: "Are There Nuclear Weapons in South Ossetia?"]

[Text] On May 27 while speaking on a Mayak Radio Station program, Nikolay Medvedev, head of the Russian Federation commission at the negotiations in South Ossetia, reported that the South Ossetian leadership stated that it has a nuclear weapon which will be "used in an extreme case".

We asked South Ossetian Armed Forces Deputy Chairman Alan Chochkev to comment on the report. He confirmed the information provided by N. Medvedev and only made it more precise by saying that "the nuclear weapon that South Ossetia has is geologic".

Our Correspondent's Commentary

How serious is the South Ossetian leadership's statement and isn't it a simple bluff? An investigation conducted by our newspaper last year showed that a geophysical or tectonic weapon was actually developed in the USSR, despite the UN Convention (5 October 1978) (adopted at the initiative of the Soviet Union) that bans "the stimulation of seismic waves, using any methods or devices, that results in earthquakes. Incidentally, the USSR Ministry of Defense in the person of its Chief

Seismologist Major-General V. Bocharov has categorically rejected any hints on the existence of tectonic weapons: "... the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Academy of Sciences have not conducted, are not conducting, and do not intend to conduct any research or development whatsoever in this sphere". In so doing, the general also could not refute a series of convincing scientific data that attest to the fact that underground nuclear explosions can in principle result in an earthquake.

S. Sokolov

The Military's Commentary

In a military sense, South Ossetia is weaker than Georgia which is antagonistic toward it. Maybe, this has also served as the "impetus" for the appearance of this "sensation"? Questioning of competent people in the military department and in a number of VPK [Military-Industrial Complex] organizations lead to just one thing: the statement on the "tectonic" weapon is a "canard". The former Soviet Army left just a helicopter regiment in South Ossetia which, according to the TOE, should not have such weapons.

A. Khokhlov

ARMS TRADE

Operation of Military Commercial Center

92UM1074B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 May 92 p 3

[Article by Captain 1st Rank Yu. Kremnev, head of the Section for Planning Commercial Activities of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, under the rubric "The Army": "Is There to Be a Commercial Center?"]

[Text] The matter of privatizing military property freed as a result of the reduction of the armed forces and problems related to this have recently been extensively discussed in the mass media. The current importance of this subject is born out by the following figure. The overall value of this property is assessed by the experts at around a trillion rubles. Given the shortage of money and materials encountered in the resolution of immediate economic and social problems in the Russian Federation, it would seem extremely important that these freed military resources be disposed off prudently and with maximum benefit for Russia.

For this purpose the decision was adopted at the end of 1991 to set up special military commercial structures in the armed forces: a commercial center of the armed forces, commercial directorates, sections and groups in the army and navy. It was planned to finance them with funds from the commercial activities, and the total number of servicemen employed in all the commercial structures was to be around 100.

The commercial center was charged with compiling a single data bank on the freed military property and the trade and economic partners; with planning, coordinating, licensing and monitoring commercial activities in the armed forces; and with arranging the process of salvaging technical military property and establishing the enterprises necessary to employ the former servicemen. The establishment of military commercial structures made it possible to regulate the military units' sale of military property, which was frequently carried out under economically disadvantageous terms and involved violations of the law.

The commercial center began by gathering data on the extra freed property and on the establishment of entrepreneurial structures, with the participation of the Ministry of Defense, and by working up normative documents governing commercial activities in the armed forces. At the same time it prepared a commercial program which would make it possible to resolve as rapidly as possible a number of urgent problems having to do with strengthening social protection for servicemen. I shall describe it in the most general terms by saying that the program called for a range of measures involving housing construction, the commercial use of military airfields, port and mooring facilities, communication lines and channels, and unfinished housing projects, the leasing of warehouse facilities, the establishment of a system of repair and restoration stations for

agricultural motor transport, and much more. It was planned to build establishments and joint enterprises, together with Russian entrepreneurs, at the deployment sites of the armed forces abroad which are under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. It was planned to establish a system of small enterprises, associations and joint-stock companies, and to staff them mainly with officers, shore-based and seagoing warrant officers released from the army.

The plan for building the commercial center and the corresponding structures in the army and navy did not come into being in a single day, of course. An extensive study was first made of such projects in other states. The most acceptable and effective we found to be the system for selling written-off and excess military property used in the USA, where this is handled by the Defense Department itself, or rather by a special service within the department for the sale of military property, which has authority in the army and navy over the regional directorates, departments and groups. The total number of workers in the U.S. military commercial agencies is around 2,000. Mainly civilian specialists work in the sales service, while military personnel are appointed only to administrative positions. All of the money acquired from the sale of military property remains at the disposal of the Defense Department.

The very first steps taken by the commercial center and its subdivisions met with great approval and support in the army and navy. Today, however, the commercial center, like military commercial structures within the CIS Joint Armed Forces, have practically lost their legal basis as a result of the Ukase on the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation issued by the President of the Russian Federation (under which the matters of financing and providing material-technical support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and protecting the social and economic rights of military personnel were assigned to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation). The commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces therefore decided to dissolve them. The validity of the president's ukase is in no way being questioned. Only Russian structures should dispose of the freed military property. Something else alarms me. Are we not going to end up throwing overboard everything which we have already built and which has begun to prove itself?

At the present time the state commission (headed by Col Gen D.A. Volkogonov, adviser to the President of the Russian Federation on defense matters) is working out the structure of the Ministry of Defense, the Army and Navy of the Russian Federation. I would hope that this structure will also have a place for agencies to decide on matters of selling or utilizing the freed military property. We have to face the fact that this problem is not going away. If it is not handled by military commercial structures, however, new entrepreneurial structures will appear, willing to take over everything. There are grounds for such expectations. There have been many

cases of the illegal transfer of military property as contributions to the statutory capital of joint-stock companies, associations and joint enterprises. The following is just one example.

The Central Sports Club of the Army and Navy and the Main Billeting Directorate of the CIS Joint Armed Forces established an enterprise called "Soccer Club of the TsSKA [Central Sports Club of the Army]." State property (both real estate and moveable property) worth more than 37 million rubles was contributed to its statutory fund. There are great doubts about the objectivity of its valuation. For example, a boarding school on Petrovsko-Razumovskaya Avenue was assessed at only 131,300 rubles, the Arkhangelskoye soccer center with a residential building, a gymnasium and a soccer field was assessed at 386,000 rubles, a hotel in Lefortovo at 667,000 rubles, the Vatutyanka sports training center at 182,700 rubles and the Kudepstvo sports training center at 13,100 rubles. Two Ikarus buses were assessed at a total of 200,000 rubles, two RAF vehicles at 60,000 and two GAZ-3102 vehicles at 80,000 rubles. Furthermore, all the real estate was turned over to the enterprise along with the fixed capital and the land and water areas attached to them.

That is not all though. In addition to these legal persons, the founders of the enterprise "Soccer Club of the TsSKA" also included four physical persons, who contributed from 15,000 to 25,000 rubles to the statutory fund. A look at the charter of this enterprise, registered with the Moscow Registration Chamber, however, reveals an interesting detail. If the enterprise is disbanded, all of its property is shared equally by the founders. Here we have the most blatant form of privatization by the nomenklatura and the creation of Russian multimillionaires acquiring their capital through the illegal use of military property.

Military property belongs to the Russian Federation, and things have to be arranged in such a way that income from its sale goes not into the pockets of an entrepreneur but for the implementation of social programs and for other state purposes.

Scandal From Sale of Rifles to Orenburg Oblast

92UM1074A Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 May 92 p 1

[Aksent report: "The Administration Is Arming Itself"]

[Text] Orenburg—A scandal is brewing around the sale of about 100 carbines which belonged to the former Soviet Army to members of the oblast administration and other officials. Vladislav Shapovalenko, an agent of the Russian Federation's President, was among those purchasing the carbine at a fabulously low price.

Under existing laws these carbines may be sold only to commercial hunters, and there are practically none of these in the oblast, since there is nothing here to hunt with these rapid-fire rifles. The carbine has a firing range of more than 5 kilometers. The matter has been brought

before the deputies of the oblast soviet, but it is already apparent that there has been a gross violation of regulations governing the sale and ownership of destructive systems for rifled weapons. Orenburg residents are asking the reasonable questions: Whom is the President's agent planning to fight off? And what are his comrades-in-arms planning to hunt with the army rifle?

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Remedies for Faltering Conversion Program

92UM1044A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 May 92 p 2

[Article by Oleg Rosnitskiy, professor, Conversion Assistance Center, Foreign Policy Association: "More on Conversion: Defense Sector Still on Hold"]

[Text] The conversion concept developed by the Foreign Policy Association under the leadership of Eduard Shevardnadze was published by us shortly before the August takeover attempt (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 6 August 1991) and soon after its failure (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 18 September 1991). The purpose of this concept was threefold:

- the advancement of ideas and views designed to reduce the level of military confrontation, particularly that with the USA and NATO, with a steady change toward cooperation and relations as allies in the matter of creating a global system of collective security as a foreign policy basis of conversion;
- the dissemination of factual information on our defense expenditures, the furtherance of the idea of defense sufficiency, and rejection of the exhausting struggle for unquestioned parity within a wide range of armaments, as a domestic policy basis of conversion;
- the rendering of assistance in encouraging investment to effect realignment of defense enterprises, as the economic basis of conversion.

In this connection, we have always maintained that successful reform without conversion is impossible.

Developments in the political situation within the country and throughout the rest of the world have served as a confirmation that we have chosen the proper goals. Nevertheless, the favorable changes that occurred in foreign and domestic policies after the failure of the takeover attempt have not been fully utilized to accelerate conversion.

Vice Premier Gaydar is right in his assertion that the greatest difficulties associated with reform are yet to come, that they are intimately tied to the forthcoming structural perestroika. In this connection, the collapse of economic ties and shortages of raw materials and energy resources will not be the only factors to cause the activity of enterprises to come to a halt. It will be necessary to shut down a large number of inefficient facilities so that

we can effect their realignment, with enterprises under the VPK [military-industrial complex] heading the list. Their productive capacities in certain geographic areas exceed 80% of total output, with a large number of them highly specialized, some suffering a total lack of civilian products experience.

To point the large and cumbersome VPK in a different direction, it is necessary to have time and enormous finances. We have already lost quite an amount of time but have gotten nowhere. Instead of taking direct steps designed to accelerate conversion, the government took the traditional route, creating another bureaucratic structure—the State Committee on Conversion, which set out to develop a program for application over a period of five to seven years. One of the Russian President's advisors is highly optimistic in his article "Conversion Strategy" (IZVESTIYA, 25 March 1992): Conversion will require spending about 150 billion rubles, with the initial effects to be enjoyed in two or three years. Another advisor believes that conversion will cost the quite different amount of 150 billion dollars, but he also states in his optimism that "... sales of competitive military products will enable us not only to maintain our VPK, but in addition earn quite a bit of money for transforming other sectors" (IZVESTIYA, 31 March 1992). It must be realized that those forecasts of a bright future were made at the Union level and the Union conversion program died way back in the developmental stage.

And so, to acquire monies for conversion, the government intends to pursue an active trade in arms. However, according to information provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Soviet Union's revenue from arms exports in 1991 amounted to 107 million dollars, while the USA showed 3 billion dollars. If we are to assume that we will be engaged in an arms trade as lively as that of the USA, then, to "earn" 150 billion dollars for conversion, we would have to deal for 50 years!

Present planning calls for 40 billion rubles to be set aside for conversion. When we take into account the overhead, which in VPK enterprises amounts to hundreds of a percent, this sum of money is hardly sufficient to cover the salaries and wages of personnel. This being the case, any discussion of realignment "to produce consumer goods" (IZVESTIYA, 25 March 1992) is out of the question.

Therefore, it must be admitted that the government presently does not possess money for conversion, and, with the overall drop in manufacturing output, will possess none for some time to come. Optimistic statements made by new state officials do nothing more, as a rule, than to justify the creation of more bureaucratic structures. In addition, this optimism encourages in VPK workers the false illusion that the government has the situation well in hand and will resolve their problems.

It should be kept in mind that the VPK was always financed quite generously. There were many orders. If dates for completion of orders could not be met, there would be changes in technical tasking, more agreements made with the customer (USSR Ministry of Defense), and the enterprises would receive new financing and new completion dates. If any savings were made, this would be in the area of salaries and wages of rank-and-file workers. The VPK took shape as a highly inefficient sector of the economy for decades, but at the same time was creating in the minds of its workers the impression that it was a highly stable established order. Dependency tendencies remain to this day, unfortunately. Add to this the fact that reduction in funding for the VPK came at a time when enterprises were undergoing a shift to so-called economic independence, a time when enterprises quickly learned how to raise salaries and wages in an environment of reduced financing and unchanging labor productivity.

The abovementioned considerations do not constitute an adequate basis for us to share the optimism displayed by the state officials, who hope to attain success in a short period of time with extremely modest funding. What is to be done?

We have already written about how there is only one way to inject life into conversion, to prevent a total collapse of the scientific, technical, and manufacturing potential of the VPK, and that is to invite private capital, both of the domestic and the foreign kind. To this end, it would be logical to include the majority of VPK enterprises in the process of radical economic reform, the key element being privatization. In addition to improving the efficiency of enterprises, the state would enjoy a ponderable budget increase, thus endowing it with the capability of exercising economic management of the conversion process. This would of course be accompanied by the state's losing some of its grip on enterprises undergoing conversion, but nothing can be done about that. Incidentally, that was the route taken by the former GDR and Hungary. Our domestic commercial structures, such as the stock exchanges, have already accumulated sufficient initial capital that could be invested in conversion.

There is quite a number of foreign businessmen who would be willing to invest money in our economy, including conversion. Although any discussion of credit on their part is out of the question, the creation of joint manufacturing ventures is completely possible. However, it is we who must offer the ventures that could interest foreign partners. Most promising in this area are diversified ventures, with their promise of cost recovery via foreign exchange. Also feasible is investment in marketing of our know-how.

Moscow Seminars View 'Alarming' State of Military Industry

*PM0206101192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 May 92 p 1*

[Report by correspondents Lieutenant-Colonel A. Dolgikh and Captain Third Rank Yu. Gladkevich: "Defense Industry in Very Acute Crisis. Urgent Measures Needed"]

[Text] Several impressive conferences, seminars, and conferences on the problem of conversion have been held in Moscow in the last week or so of May. These included the international forum "World Experience and the Russian Economy" and a scientific-practical conference at the General Staff Military Academy entitled "Russia's Scientific and Technical Potential and Conversion in Market Conditions...." The leaders of defense complex enterprises, associations, establishments, and organizations set aside all their affairs to spend almost two weeks in the capital in the hope of obtaining answers to the very acute questions bound up with the future of Russia's defense complex and securing the adoption of urgent solutions. But it turned out that the Russian parliament and government essentially failed to attach proper significance to such an impressive "congress" of defense complex leaders. And, weary of fruitless discussion, many of those assembled there refused to take part in the Russian-American forum entitled "One Hundred Russian Conversion Projects Open for Cooperation," scheduled for 23 May, although they had paid to do so in advance...

All this, in the opinion of many, foreshadowed the failure of another seminar of top defense industry leaders—"The Economy, Conversion, and Problems of National Security of the Fatherland," scheduled for 26-28 May. Nevertheless, representatives of more than 500 defense complex enterprises and organizations did attend.

However, the first two hours of the seminar's work were enough to indicate that it might be just as unproductive as its predecessors. And the seminar participants then dispatched a delegation to Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov and sent a telephone message to Yegor Gaydar demanding a meeting with Russian leadership representatives. The third day's work essentially turned out to be the most productive.

Speakers at the seminar—Academician L. Abalkin; Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces; G. Matyukhin, chairman of the Board of the Central Bank of Russia; A. Kokoshin, First Deputy Defense Minister; and A. Pochinok, chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on the Budget, Plans, Taxes, and Prices—answered seminar participants' questions and listened to their demands. More detailed material on the state of affairs in the defense complex has been prepared by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Here, however, let us just briefly say that the problems of the defense industry amount to the following: Finance has been drastically slashed, enterprises' debts in terms of reciprocal settlements are rising catastrophically, and wholesale conversion is getting out of control and is taking place without a well-considered conversion program, which threatens mass unemployment, enterprise stoppages, and the unjustified reduction of Russia's defense potential.

Judging by the Russian leadership representatives' speeches at the seminar, the government and presidential apparatus are aware of the alarming situation in the defense complex. Intensive work on appropriate documents is under way in parliamentary committees and commissions and in the government to ensure that measures are taken as quickly as possible and the urgent reform of the defense complex carried out.

Russia is today determining its statehood. Questions concerning its security and the organizational development of the Armed Forces are also being clarified. And only raucous soapbox orators are capable of recklessly demanding that the military-industrial complex inherited from the former Union be razed to the ground. Russia needs the defense industry—that is incontrovertible. But if the process of drafting essential documents and making decisions starts to become academic and long-drawn-out, there will be nothing to preserve and reform. The defense industry will collapse, and it will be many times more expensive for the country to restore the Russian defensive shield and will require an effort such as the people will scarcely be able to manage. Time urgently presses us on and demands immediate decisions.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Examination of U.S.-Indian Military Cooperation

PM0206151992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 May 92 p 2

[Article by Major E. Fedoseyev: "Who Will Tug the Indian Blanket Over Him? Naval Exercises in the Light of Interstate Relations"]

[Excerpts] Joint two-day Indian-U.S. naval exercises have been held in the Indian Ocean—the first in the history of the two countries' relations. The objective of the exercises, as announced in Delhi, was to enhance the combat readiness of the Indian Navy and master the latest methods of waging combat operations. [passage omitted].

The strength of the pro-U.S. thrust of Indian policy is indicated by the fact that these exercises went ahead despite the recent attempt by the U.S. Administration to influence the rocket deal between Glavkosmos [Russia's Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research] and the Indian Space Research Organization. The extreme indignation expressed by the Indian side and the calls to curtail relations with the United States proved to be just a storm in a teacup.

The United States had been waiting for such changes for a long time and was prepared for them, aware of the importance of relations—above all, military relations—with India. The U.S. Pacific Command, for example, as reported by JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, regards

India as a regional power which is to play one of the main roles in the region of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. From this standpoint, India is a useful ally for the United States.

Here the U.S. Administration is seeking to grasp hold of the most important link in the chain of state relations with India—military cooperation. This is no wonder, since India, wishing to exert decisive influence on the situation in South Asia, is seeking to create modern, strong Armed Forces.

For many years this task was tackled by Indian-Soviet relations. However, the disintegration of the USSR and a certain holdup in the development of Russian-Indian ties have put Delhi in a difficult position. This opportunity was seized by the United States, which immediately offered to supply India with large consignments of weapons, including F-16 fighter bombers, aircraft fitted with the AWACS system, a system for tracking enemy missiles, and satellites for military purposes. Such adroitness on the part of the United States is understandable, since, apart from being a strategically useful ally, India also constitutes one of the biggest arms markets.

And yet, despite such an unhappy situation for Russia, the opportunity to even up the situation does still exist. And the grounds for such a claim are pretty soundly based. The point is that the military equipment and infrastructure of the Indian Armed Forces are so strongly wedded to the Russian economy that reorienting them toward the United States will demand huge financial outlay. To reequip just one airfield previously used for Soviet-made aircraft and make it suitable for the U.S. F-16's will require hundreds of millions of dollars let alone the cost of purchasing the actual planes. Moreover, it is cheaper to buy military equipment in Russia. At least it has been until recently. And, what is very important, clearing and barter transactions have been used in this respect.

So the Americans have managed to grasp one end of the Indian blanket. And they are making every effort to draw it over themselves. Both military-industrial firms and the administration are involved in this. We, however, have gotten hold of the economic end of the blanket, but are unable to work out who exactly should be pulling on it. The answer being that we should all be pulling on it together.

SECURITY SERVICES

Official on Russian Border Guards in Baltics

92UM1066A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 May 92 First edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Valentin Gaponenko, head of the Baltic Border District, by Major S. Knyazkov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "On Foreign Borders?"]

[Text] Lieutenant-General Valentin Gaponenko tells why our border troops are in the Baltic area.

From the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA File: V.K. Gaponenko was born in 1929 in Vitebsk. He graduated from a military school and the General Staff Military Academy. He served as commander of the Pacific Border District and has commanded the Baltic Border District since 1966. A 13 March 1992 decree issued by President B. Yeltsin transferred the district to Russia's jurisdiction. That same decree appointed the commander of the Baltic Air Defense District as plenipotentiary of the RF [Russian Federation] for the temporary presence and the withdrawal of the border troops from the territory of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

[Knyazkov] More than a month has gone by since Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree on the Transfer of the Baltic Border District to Russia's Jurisdiction. You can no doubt already tell us something about how the decree is being implemented.

[Gaponenko] We have had working meetings with representatives of the ministries of defense and border structures of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. At the meetings we defined the range of issues which must be agreed upon in connection with the implementation of the decree. The main stress was on joint protection of the border and the resolution of disputed issues.

In addition, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has begun the actual process of working out the concept for negotiations on the removal of the border troops and the development of Russia's borders with Estonia and Latvia.

[Knyazkov] Now, Valentin Konstantinovich, I would like to know how you assess the negotiating process. How is it different?

[Gaponenko] It should be pointed out that the talks are being conducted in such a way that we are resolving the general problems jointly with the Northwest Group of Forces and the Baltic Fleet. This particularly applies to social protection for the servicemen, the deadline for the removal of troops, and many other things. The new border is a separate problem for us border troops, and there will be a separate agreement on this matter.

In general, I feel that the talks are moving forward, albeit with difficulty. Including the talks on border issues. Right now the largest advances have been made in the talks with Latvia. We have conducted three rounds of talks and prepared a draft agreement, in which most of the provisions have been agreed upon. However, there are still areas of dispute.

[Knyazkov] What are the sharpest disagreements?

[Gaponenko] Right now there has been no reciprocity in three matters. First of all, the matter of military property (both real estate and moveable property). The Baltic states demand that all property be turned over to them without recompense. We cannot agree to that, of course.

It will take hundreds of millions of rubles to build up the Russian border and to provide social protection for the officers and warrant officers and their families. We have a clear picture of Russia's economic situation and know that it will be very difficult to find this money in the current situation. In view of this we are insisting that some of the military property be sold. This would give us a certain amount of materials and money with which to build up the new border and resolve social issues for the border troops and their families.

[Knyazkov] What is the second point of contention?

[Gaponenko] The border district's housing pool. It is our position that all housing be privatized without recompense and turned over to the servicemen and their families. They could then exchange it for housing in any part of the CIS or sell the apartments here and buy themselves apartments wherever they wish.

The Latvian side feels that we should simply leave these apartments. Corresponding legislation has been passed in support of this. Housing for officers and warrant officers has been declared as service housing, and it is forbidden to register anyone for occupancy in place of those who are replaced.

I do not believe the Russian delegation will ever agree to this, because this is a direct infringement of the rights of servicemen and their families.

[Knyazkov] And the third issue?

[Gaponenko] The deadline for removal of the troops, and it is perhaps the most important issue.

The governments of the Baltic states name different deadlines. First they talked about the end of 1992. Now they are suggesting the end of '93.... We believe that this is not realistic, because our interests have to do primarily with maintaining Russia's defense capability and security, including that on Russia's borders with the Baltic republics.

Let us be realists. To build border security at new lines for the period proposed by our partners in the talks is not realistic. It would require considerable financial and material outlays, developing the new borders and building new military posts and housing for the families of the officers and warrant officers.... It will undoubtedly take more time than suggested by the delegations from the Baltic republics. We will have to reach agreement on the matter.

[Knyazkov] Do we already know where the new Russian border will lie?

[Gaponenko] Although the talks have not reached that point, it is already clear that they will be very difficult and intense.... Right now Estonia is claiming 2,449 square kilometers of Russian territory, Latvia 1,293.5. And they are not just claiming it; they have already put it into law.

The Russian government and the Russian Supreme Soviet have declared these enactments to be void of legal force. The matter of where the border will lie is therefore a very complicated one.

The Russian delegation is proceeding on the basis of the Helsinki agreements and rejecting the territorial claims of Latvia and Estonia. A mutually acceptable solution still has to be found, however. Otherwise the talks will stall.

[Knyazkov] Life goes on though, and we would therefore like to know how the Russian border guards are occupied in the Baltic states.

[Gaponenko] For several years in a row 98% of the district personnel have been Russians. The majority are from Moscow and Moscow Oblast, and from Orenburg, Novgorod, Penza and Saratov oblasts. And I would like to take advantage of this occasion to express our gratitude through your newspaper to the parents for sending their sons to serve in our district.

[Knyazkov] But how are we occupied?

[Gaponenko] Large batches of weapons have been seized at the check points. Recently in Tallin, for example, contraband was seized consisting of several thousand pistols destined for Russia. In Klaypeda we seized a large batch of weapons, several thousand, headed from Germany to Lithuania....

In addition, drugs and terrorist supplies are confiscated. Monetarily, the effect of our work amounts to tens of millions of rubles.

[Knyazkov] In short, the work load has not decreased?

[Gaponenko] Added to this, unfortunately, is concern over discriminatory measures being passed by the Baltic states toward district officers and warrant officers and their families.

The servicemen have lived here a long time without a registration. They are constantly reminded to vacate their apartments, which have already been assigned to local citizens.... Since they have no registration, it is difficult to find jobs for their wives and to place their children into kindergartens and schools. But where do the people have to go? Nowhere. Nothing has been built for them in Russia, after all, and not all of them have relatives to take them in....

The servicemen are prompted to leave Latvia also because of the passport system. When an officer is released he is not issued a passport here. It is absolutely clear that he cannot obtain citizenship here. And Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is unable to reach agreement with its counterparts from the Baltic area on even the passport problem.

[Knyazkov] That is politics, so to speak, on the state level. But let us drop down, Valentin Konstantinovich, to the level of the outpost, the detachment....

[Gaponenko] Our military posts and housing areas constantly face the threat of having their water, heat and electric power cut off. If you are obedient to the local authorities, you have everything. If something is not quite right, then be prepared for a blockade.

Or take the matter of obtaining food. We have to buy it, after all, and we pay a lot for it. At the same time we are issued an ultimatum: Either supply us with fuel or we will not give you food. Where would the commanders get any extra fuel? Russia issues it to military personnel to perform their service duties. There is nothing left over. We therefore have to resort to various tricks and violations of the law.

And so we sometimes do things which are not exactly legal, but everyday life faces us with difficulties with which it is not easy to deal.

[Knyazkov] The best thing in this situation would be to withdraw with dignity, of course. Until an interstate agreement is concluded, however, it is the district's duty, under the decree of the president of Russia, jointly to guard the borders....

[Gaponenko] Some of our comrades are confused? Why, they ask, should we jointly guard the border of foreign states? This sense of confusion is also found in the

governments of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, who demand that the guarding of the borders be turned over to them immediately. It needs to be clearly understood, however, that by jointly guarding the border with the Baltic states right now, we are ensuring Russia's security. Furthermore, we are forced to do this by the fact that the new borders are not yet built up and are not protected in any way by anyone.

In the first place, we began the joint guarding of the border at check points, and the documents are presently drawn up so that citizens of the CIS are served by district border troops, while citizens of the Baltic states are served by border troops of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

Security is jointly provided also at the outposts. Border troops of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia secure the rear lines, as it were, and there is an exchange of information, while we turn border violators over to them. Right now Latvia has several border ships which operate jointly and interact with border district ships. We also help with the training of border troops for the Baltic states.

I consider the joint guarding of the borders to be beneficial to both the border troops of the Baltic states and those of Russia. But all of this, I underscore, is only until an agreement is concluded and the troops are removed.

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